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Abstract 
Determining and assessing fraud requires specialised skills that may not be 
consistent with the usual skills/knowledge and training of accounting auditors. 
Indeed, recent studies, Rezaee et al, 2016 and Wright & Zimbelman, 2015, have 
shown that auditors are usually unsuccessful assessors of fraud risk valuations. 
Same conclsion was also drawn by previous studies: Cushing et al., 1995; 
Nieschwietz et al., 2000; Allen et al., 2006.  However, forensic auditors may be 
skilled enough to make up for such limitations.  Therefore, the aim of this study 
was to discover the level of forensic accounting skills among government auditors 
in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and how these skills may affect their 
performance in fraud risk valuation.  The study also examined the role of mental 
representation in connecting forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation.  
This study is the first in the context of Dubai to examine how different forensic 
accounting skills affect the fraud-related judgment of government auditors.  This 
study adds to knowledge concerning differences in fraud risk task performance 
between forensic accounting auditors and accounting auditors, and considers how 
accounting auditors’ approach to fraud might be improved by adopting forensic 
accounting skills.  Moreover, this study enriches the literature by highlighting 
fraud-related mental representations as a possible intermediate stage of forensic 
accounting skills used in fraud risk valuation.  The outcomes of this study provide 
practical evidence that auditors' fraud risk valuation capability can be improved 
via the implementation of forensic accounting skills.  The results suggest that 
government auditors with high forensic accounting skills assessed greater fraud 
risk in both the high and low fraud risk scenarios than government auditors with 
low forensic accounting skills.  Government auditors with high forensic 
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accounting skills developed a mental representation that was different from 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  Lastly, the relationship 
between auditors’ forensic skills and fraud risk valuation is direct and there is no 
support for a mediation.  It was recommended that there is a need for advance 
training for accounting auditors in forensic accounting skills.  
 
Keywords  
Fraud, Forensic accounting skills, Accounting auditors, Government auditors, Fraud risk 
valuation, Fraud triangle, Fraud Diamond Theory, Financial Audit Department, Dubai.  
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Fraud risk valuation assists an auditor in defining the nature and level of the audit 
events intended to raise the likelihood of fraud exposure (Bloomfield, 1997; Wuerges, 
2011).  Consequently, fraud risk valuations help auditors to determine the procedures 
that are necessary to perform an audit or investigation (Gerson et al., 2006).  However, 
previous studies have revealed that accountants are usually poor evaluators of fraud 
risk valuation, because fraud detection is not their main training (Allen et al., 2006; 
Asare et al, 2015).   
In a major experiment, Boritz et al. (2008), investigated whether fraud experts 
such as forensic accountants are more skilful than accountants in discerning deception 
during an audit.  The results of his study suggested that forensic accountants are better 
able than accountants to notice fraud, particularly when there is a major threat of 
dishonesty.  A recent study of the connection between the knowledge and mentality 
of forensic auditors concerning fraud risk valuation, discovered that forensic auditors 
have advanced levels of knowledge, a more appropriate mentality, and better fraud 
risk valuation than accountants in the areas of fraud anticipation/deterrent, discovery, 
and response (Popoola, 2015).  
To the best knowledge of author, no other research has examined the relationship 
of forensic accounting skills on fraud risk valuation and the possible role of mental 
representation in this relationship in the context of Dubai.  Whilst it has been reported 
that forensic auditors have a higher information and mind set than accountants during 
mission performance (Boritz et al. 2008; Chui, 2010; Popoola, 2015), it remains 
unclear whether the same can be said for government auditors who have acquired 
forensic accounting skills.  Thus, the purpose of this study was to explore whether 
14 
 
there was a substantial difference in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation 
of government auditors with low and high forensic accounting skills.  The study also 
examined the role of mental representation in the connection between forensic 
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation by government auditors.  
1.2 Motivation and Need for the Study 
Fraud and corruption have been highlighted as main concern of economies and 
countries over the past 25 years, since the Enron scandal. In addition, enhancing skills of 
auditors and investigators have become a major prerequisite for prospers economies. 
The researcher is a police officer working in the field of forensic accounting and 
has more than 15 years of working experience with government auditors to detect and 
combat fraud.  The personal motivation for this study is the observation that there might 
be a gap in forensic accounting skills among government auditors. Therefore, the 
researcher set out to inspect forensic accounting skills among government auditors in 
Dubai and to examine in what way these skills affect their performance in fraud risk 
valuation.  Further, numerous researchers have called for further research into the area of 
forensic accounting to understand the exposure of fraud in organisations (Baron, 2006; 
Baird and Zelin, 2009; Covaleski 2003; Wells, 2005; Gottschalk, 2010). 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Lately, a sequence of frauds has been detected both within the public sector and 
in the private sector of the economy. A study conducted by PWC entitled “Economic 
Crime in the UAE” found that 27% of the UAE respondents reported economic crime 
within their organizations, a figure  that is significantly above Middle East’s average 
of 22%. PWC study also reported that  asset misappropriation (78%) is the most 
common financial crime in the UAE, followed  by cybercrime, procurement fraud, 
and bribery and corruption. The study also shows that  56% of UAE respondent 
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reported that their organization lost between $100,000 and $5 million due to economic 
crime (fraud) which is higher that global average of 2% (PWC, 2014).  The above 
average rate usually comes with enonomic prosperity and growing economy. 
According to Dubai's police chief, Dhabi Khalfan Tamim, fraud and deception 
within Dubai's state-linked corporations is high and tough new penalties need to be 
imposed on violators.  He has also stated that Dubai has witnessed numerous high-
profile deception cases since the financial crisis in 2008, and, as there is an abnormally 
high rate of corruption, there are many people involved in such acts (Sleiman, 2009). 
A recently issued declaration has the authority to enforce prison terms of up to 20 
years for criminals, following the tightening of financial regulations by the 
Government in the wake of its debt crisis.  In 2009, the Dubai public prosecutor 
accused several businesspersons and former bank executives on charges of corruption 
and dishonesty, claiming that they had defrauded the Dubai Islamic Bank of more 
than AED 1.8 billion.  However, analysts note that regulation in Dubai has failed to 
keep up with the rapid development in business (Sleiman, 2009). 
It is also important to note that auditing and forensic accounting is very important 
in the public sector than private sector; the issue is related to public money and 
government financing. Public interest is important and require governments to 
minimize waste and fraud. Any miss use of economic resources would impact the 
whole economy.  Dubai is also an important setting for this research because of the 
increased prominence of Dubai as a regional economic power house with wide 
reaching implications for whatever happening in Dubai. In his study, Kasum (2009) 
evaluates the extent of financial crimes in developing countries and compares the 
private and public sector with a target to clarify the sector where the services of 
forensic accountant are more essential. The study found that forensic accountant has 
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a role to play, generally, but more in public sector. Hence, the study recommends the 
strengthening of forensic accounting organisation and utilization of their services in 
public sector of developing nations economies.  
Detecting fraud has become a priority within the accounting profession (Elliott, 
2002).  Identifying and assessing fraud requires specialised skills that may not feature 
in the usual training and knowledge of audit accountants.  Auditors have the capability 
to detect fraud, but they often lack the necessary skills and knowledge to translate this 
information into a plan that can aid in the future identification of risk factors for 
fraudulent activities (Boritz, 2014).  This study examines one of these factors, forensic 
accounting skills, for the reason that implementing forensic accounting skills among 
accounting auditors is a low-cost alternative to recruiting a forensic accountant.  If 
high skills in forensic accounting compared to low forensic accounting skills can 
produce more actual fraud risk valuation, then this would prompt audit organisations 
to improve an auditor’s fraud risk valuation through enhancing forensic accounting 
skills.  
Variations in performance of forensic accountants and other accountants could be 
related to different variable, such as differences in intelligence, information/skills, 
practice, experience or other individual characteristics (Boritz et al., 2008; Chui, 
2010; Popoola, 2015).  Based on the literature on performance differences between 
forensic accounting and auditors (Asare and Wright, 2004; Boritz et al., 2008; 
Popoola, 2015), mental representation is a possible mediator in the connection 
between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation performance.  This 
potential mediator allows individuals to produce a mental representation of how they 
should deal with and resolve the mission at hand (Koonce, 1993; Bonner, 2007).  In 
fact, if typical audit training does not provide future accountants with the skills 
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required for today's work environment, then it is essential to see whether adding 
forensic accounting skills would better equip them for the demands they face. 
1.4 Purpose Statement  
The purpose of this study was to explore whether there was a substantial variance 
in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation of government auditors who had low 
and high forensic accounting skills.  The study also examined the role of mental 
representation in the connection between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk 
valuation of government auditors.  The study intended to determine whether high forensic 
accounting skills as opposed to low skills might result in superior fraud risk valuation.    
This examination could enrich the knowledge of accounting auditors, who may become 
more aware of the importance of forensic accounting skills and could enhance their ability 
in conducting a fraud risk valuation.  
 This study had the distinctive variables of the interrogation and litigation 
categories of forensic accountant skills, to investigate how these different skills may 
affect the government auditors in focusing their audit processes.  The researcher would 
like to fill the literature gap in terms of the forensic accounting skills of government 
auditors.  In other words, in a team of forensic accountants and accounting auditors to 
detect fraud, the forensic accountant would rather work with auditors who have high 
forensic accounting skills rather than those with low forensic accounting skills.  Onodi 
Okafor, and Onyali (2015) found that in order to be effective in reducing fraudulent 
practices in the banking sector, forensic accountants should have the appropriate skills. 
1.5 Research Questions  
For the purpose of this study, the researcher used litigation and interrogation skills 
of forensic accounting as construct components for forensic accounting skills (Fillmer  
2003; Phillips 2009).  
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The research questions of the study are as follows:  
RQ1: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills measure 
fraud risk as greater, in both high and low fraud risk scenarios, compared to government 
auditors with low forensic accounting skills? 
RQ2: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills develop a 
mental representation that is different from government auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills? 
RQ3: Will government auditors with a high mental representation in fraud issues 
would assess fraud risk as higher in both low and high fraud risk scenarios? will 
government auditors with a high mental representation in audit issues would assess fraud 
risk as lower in both low and high fraud risk scenarios? 
RQ4: Does mental representation mediate the connection between forensic 
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation? 
1.6 Major Contributions of the Study  
This study is the first to examine how different skills in forensic accounting affect 
fraud risk valuations in the context of Dubai.  The results it yields will enhance the 
literature on how different skills in forensic accounting influence fraud risk task 
performance.  
Furthermore, the study promotes knowledge in the field by discovering fraud-
linked mental representation as a probable intermediary between forensic accounting 
skills and fraud risk valuation.  The results of this study provide support to the theory that 
auditors’ fraud risk valuation can perhaps be improved through adopting forensic 
accounting skills. 
1.7 Thesis Structure  
 Chapter 2 presents a discussion on the perception of the concept of fraud and the 
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underlying theory, together with an examination of the roles of internal and external 
auditors.  In addition, the chapter describes the role of forensic accounting and the skills 
involved; the difference between audit processes and forensic accounting, and differences 
between auditors and forensic accountants in terms of their perception of fraud.  The 
chapter also includes the development of this study’s hypotheses and research framework 
based on the literature review.   
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the methodology employed in this 
study including the research measured variables.  Chapter 4 gives a detailed description 
of the results following the use of the investigational instrument to assess government 
auditors in Dubai.  Finally, Chapter 5 provides discussion and conclusion, implications 
and recommendation for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an outline of the research structure and a review of the 
relevant literature.  The chapter starts by detailing the concept of fraud and the underlying 
theory behind it.  The related literature on the roles of internal and external auditors is 
then reviewed, along with the role and skills of forensic accounting, a comparison of audit 
processes and forensic accounting, and differences between auditors and forensic 
accountants and their perceptions of fraud. The associated literature on fraud risk 
valuation is then reviewed, followed by a debate on mental representations.   
2.2 The Concept of Fraud and its Underlying Theory  
There is an impression that fraud is spread across the globe, and it is commonly 
held belief that the task of accounting auditors is to find error as part of the remit for 
auditing financial statements (Hussain et al., 2010).  Accounting auditors, forensic 
accountant, regulators and others need financial statements to be free of material error.  
In the United Arab Emirates, and particularly in Dubai, business is growing dramatically. 
Corruption, too, is increasing rapidly, despite the efforts of auditors and forensic 
investigators working together to detect fraud.  However, auditors’ forensic accounting 
skills should be enhanced in order to combat fraud.  In other words, accounting auditors 
ought to be skilled enough to contend with these fraudulent activities.  Fraud - defined as 
‘dishonesty in the form of an intentional deception or a wilful misrepresentation of a 
material fact’ (Bologna and Lindquist, 1995, p.10) - has always existed within society. 
According to Anyanwu (1993), fraud is a performance of deception, intentionally trained 
to increase an illegal or unfair advantage, such as dishonesty focused to the detriment of 
another. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, fraud is the deliberate 
misrepresentation of fact for the purposeof depriving someone of a valuable possession 
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(Britannica, 2009).  Ernst and Young (2009) defined deception as a performance of 
thoughtful action made by an entity, meaningful that such an action can affect in the 
custody of illegal benefits, whilst Keshi (2011) described deception as a means by which 
an individual can accomplish a benefit over another by false proposals or defeat of the 
truth.  However, despite these various definitions of fraud, the most appropriate one for 
the purposes of this study is by the well-known professional organization the Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2004, p.1): fraud is ‘…the use of one’s occupation 
for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organisation’s resources or assets.’  Fraud usually comprises some form of dishonesty. 
Golden, Skalak, and Mona (2006) suggest that there are numerous different kinds 
of fraud, although employee and financial statement fraud are the most relevant to 
auditors.  Employee fraud includes the robbery of cash or inventory, finance fraud, 
kickbacks, and appropriation, whereas financial statement fraud is characterised by 
intended misstatements or errors of amounts in financial reporting with the aim of 
misleading financial statement users.  
2.3 Fraud Triangle Theory (FTT) and Fraud Diamond Theory (FDT)  
The practice of theory allows one to clarify visible facts and to offer a theoretical 
basis for predicting future events for business management (Salkind, 2006). The 
theoretical framework of the study will be based on Donald Cressey’s (1953) fraud 
triangle theory (FTT) and the eventual expansion of the fraud diamond theory (FDT) 
(Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004).  In an attempt to understand the underlying theory behind 
fraud, Cressey (1953) conducted 200 interviews with convicted fraudsters over a period 
of five months.  Themes from the interviews revealed that fraud perpetrators were in a 
place of trust within their organisations.  They were also in situations that gave them 
access to data and opportunities to mislead their associates. 
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Considering these findings, Cressey (1953) established a concept of fraud, which 
predicts a probability of the incidence of deception related to the existence of opportunity, 
non-shareable financial difficulties, and rationalisation.  These three elements of fraud 
were summarised by Cressey (1953) and are frequently presented as in Figure 2.1.  This 
theory serves as the foundation of the FTT, which figures upon traditional fraud theory 
by listing the numerous influences that contribute to pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalisation.  
The idea of supposed opportunity proposes that individuals will take advantage of 
the conditions obtainable to them (Kelly & Hartley, 2010).  Rae and Subramanian (2008) 
highlighted that opportunity relates to the aptitude and power of an employee to identify 
weaknesses within an organisational system and to take advantage of these thereby 
making deception probable.  Generally, the lower the danger of being caught, the more 
likely it is that deception will take place (Cressey, 1953).  
Pressure is the motivation to commit fraudulent acts or activities (Wilson, 2004). 
Murdock (2008) claimed that this pressure could be linked to financial, non-financial, 
dogmatic and societal factors.  Dogmatic and societal pressure arises where an individual 
senses or believes that they cannot face being unsuccessful, due to their status or standing 
(Murdock, 2008).  
The third element of the FTT is rationalisation, which refers to the justifications 
and explanations that individuals give for why immoral conduct is different from illegal 
activity.  If an individual cannot defend their fraudulent activities, then it is improbable 
that he or she will be involved in fraud.  An example of a rationalisation is the belief that 
fraud is acceptable because an employer is cheating the person of his or her salary 
(Cressey, 1953).  
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) incorporated the 
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term the ‘fraud triangle’ into Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99 and used it 
to organise the discussion of risk factors (AICPA, 2002, p.287).  
 
Figure 2.1: The Fraud Triangle Theory 
     Source: Cressey (1953) 
 
 
The fraud triangle theory has been applied by various researchers to examine fraud 
in organisations and industries.  Aghghaleh, Iskandar, and Mohamed (2014) used the 
theory to examine the impact of pressure, opportunity, and rationalisation in determining 
fraud in financial statements.  Factors such as the size of the audit team and panel of 
directors correlated with lower levels of financial statement fraud (Aghghaleh et al., 
2014).  Consistent with the opportunity factors of the fraud diamond theory, the 
researchers found that poor internal control and supervision and improper documentation 
processes are opportunities that increase the likelihood of fraud.  Tsegba, Upaa, and 
Tyoakosu (2015) also found that factors such as weak governance, attempts to hide poor 
financial performance, and lack of compensation influence the unethical reporting of 
financial statements.    
Schuchter and Levi (2016) found that the corporate culture of companies 
influences the effect of the three components of the triangle in the event of fraud. 
Corporate culture can influence whether fraud is perpetrated, or rather whether anti-fraud 
behaviours are encouraged (Davis and Pesch, 2013).  Fraud is likely to occur in 
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organisations where corporate leadership is weak (Lenz and Graycar, 2016).  The 
perpetration of fraud is likely to continue in the absence of the necessary processes being 
implemented to detect fraud within organisations, underscoring the importance of strong 
corporate leadership (Lenz et al., 2016; Schuchter and Levi, 2016).  
Despite the empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of the fraud triangle 
theory, some researchers have contended that the theory is not sufficient in explaining the 
occurrence of fraud.  For instance, Free (2005) found that the nature of collusion in 
fraudulent practices and the regulatory processes that encourage whistle-blowing are new 
avenues that can offer a more thoughtful analysis of the occurrence of fraud.  McMahon, 
Pence, and Bressler (2016) noted that explaining the new tactics in fraud necessitated the 
expansion of the classic theory to the diamond theory of fraud.   
Based on the fraud diamond theory, Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) noted that even 
though perceived pressure might co-occur with opportunity and rationalisation, it is 
improbable that fraud will take place unless the fourth component of capability also 
exists.  Mackevicius and Giriunas (2013) have argued that not every individual who 
possesses motivation, opportunity, and realisation might commit deception, because they 
may lack the capability to carry it out or to cover it.  Consequently, Wolfe and Hermanson 
(2004) developed the fraud diamond theory (FDT), where capability has been added to 
the FTT as shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: The Fraud Diamond Theory 
    Source: Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) 
 
Boyle, DeZoort, and Hermanson (2015) examined the impact of fraud diamond 
theory in determining fraud.  The study involved 89 auditors who participated in 
experiments.  The results of the analysis revealed that auditors were more effective in 
evaluating fraud when the fraud diamond practice was used, compared to the fraud 
triangle method.  The factorial analysis indicated that capability of staff added a predictive 
value to the evaluation, highlighting the utility of expanding the classical theory of fraud.   
There is empirical evidence supporting the inclusion of capability in explaining 
the occurrence of fraud in organisations.  Research on the role of the capability of 
individuals revealed that there is a connection between the capability of staff and the 
perpetuation of fraud (Rayaan, Samsudin, Che-Ahmed, and Popoola, 2016).  Popoola 
(2015) also found that the capability of individuals plays a role in the perpetration of fraud 
in bank companies.  Dellaportas (2013) found that fraud offenders were able to deceive 
other people by using their positions as professional accountants, underscoring the role 
of capability in the perpetration of fraud.  When individuals have the power within an 
organisation, they have the capability to participate in fraudulent activities (Albrecht, 
Holland, Malagueño, Dolan and Tzafrir, 2015).  With this power, these individuals also 
have the capability to recruit other people within the organisation to participate in 
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fraudulent acts (Albrecht et al., 2015).  These discoveries highlight the necessity to take 
the compulsory prevention measures to limit the capability of individuals to commit 
fraud.  
An issue was raised about the two theories discussed above by (Gbegi and 
Adebisi, 2013). They suggest that even though the fraud diamond added the fourth 
variable “capability” to the fraud triangle and filled the gap in other theories of fraud, the 
model alone is an inadequate tool for investigating, deterring, preventing and detecting 
fraud. The authors state that the two sides of fraud diamond (incentive/pressure, and 
rationalization) cannot be observed, and some important factors like national value 
system and corporate governance are ignored.  
 
2.4 Theory Discussion    
Golden et al. (2006) noted that employees may either observe an incentive or feel 
under pressure to commit fraud, with pressure resulting from unrealistic expectations of 
banks, investors or others.  There may be pressure on administration, for example, to 
reach or beat the expectations of stockholders or creditors.  In contrast, an inducement 
could arise from situations that may exist for administration or other employees to commit 
fraud due to an absence of supervision, or that may be intrinsic to the nature of a business.  
Opportunity was the cause behind numerous financial statement fraud cases, which 
stemmed from gaps and weakness in internal controls and audits.  Rationalisation is the 
third aspect of the fraud triangle concept, and in some business divisions, it may be easier 
for persons to commit fraud, if there is a lack of communication regarding corporate 
ethical values. 
Experts such as Dorminey et al. (2010) referred to a second fraud triangle 
involving act, disguise and conversion.  Carpenter and Mahoney (2001) indicated that 
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fraud among non-management employees poses a greater risk to their organisations than 
external or administrative fraud.  Using these representations to identify potential 
fraudsters, will enhance a professional’s ability to prevent, deter and inspect fraud.  
Fikes (2009) claimed that there are deceptions that frequently go unnoticed, and 
when noticed, employees are infrequently punished.  The fraud triangle contains three 
components, motivation, opportunity and rationalisation, and it is asserted that if any one 
of these three components does not occur then a corruption will not happen.  However, 
Dorminey et al. (2010) claimed that the triangle alone is an insufficient tool for 
preventing, foiling, or detecting fraud, and explained that two of its features, pressure and 
rationalisation, cannot be detected.  Consequently, they argued that the original FTT lacks 
objective criteria for recognising pressure and rationalisation. 
Both the fraud triangle theory and the fraud diamond theory provide frameworks 
to understand and explain the existence of fraud (Omar, Nawawi and Puteh Salin, 2016; 
Ruankaew, 2016; Sorunke, 2016).  According to Mansor (2015), the divergence between 
the two theories necessitates further research on the role of capability in understanding 
fraud.  In addition to the three factors of rationalisation, incentive/pressure and 
opportunity, the capability of an individual also plays a role in the motivation for fraud 
(Mansor, 2015).  Specifically, an individual should have the necessary skills or traits to 
commit fraud, turning an opportunity into a reality (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).  
Dorminey et al., (2010) claimed that the triangle alone is an inadequate tool for deterring, 
preventing and detecting fraud due to the fact that two of its characteristics, pressure and 
rationalisation, cannot be observed.  A summary of Fraud Triangle and Model Extensions 
by Dorminey et al., (2010) is shown in Table 2.1. 
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Consequently, the researcher posits that auditors well trained in forensic 
accounting are a key factor in assessing fraud risk and in reducing opportunities for 
committing fraud, which is one of the corners of the fraud triangle.  This study builds on 
the opportunity angle; thus, forensic accounting and auditing are considered an essential 
part of the organisational structure which contributes to reducing fraud opportunities.  The 
Table 2.1: Summary of Fraud Triangle and Model Extensions 
Type Definition Shortcomings            Extension Benefit of 
Extension 
Fraud Triangle Convergence of 
perceived pressure, 
perceived 
opportunity, and 
rationalisation to 
facilitate fraud. 
Fraud triangle is from 
the fraudsters 
perspective, so two 
attributes (pressure and 
rationalization) are 
generally non-
observable 
Fraud diamond: adds an 
assessment of capability. 
Capability is 
generally a more 
observable 
attribute than 
pressure or 
rationalisation. 
Perceived Pressure Non-shareable 
financial need. 
Perceived pressure is an 
incomplete descriptor of 
fraudsters’ motivations. 
Expand the set of 
fraudsters’ motivations 
using MICE: money, 
ideology, coercion and 
ego (entitlement). 
MICE provide a 
broader set of 
fraud motivations 
beyond non-
shareable financial 
need. 
Perceived Opportunity Opportunity to 
commit and conceal 
the fraud act. 
Does not address 
collusive behavior or 
management override. 
Focus on an anti-fraud 
environment, such as 
culture, tone at the top, 
and engaged corporate 
governance, in addition 
to traditional internal 
controls. 
Understanding 
collusive 
behaviours better 
prepares anti-fraud 
professionals for 
the challenges of 
management 
override 
corruption, and 
abuse. 
Rationalisation Morally defensible 
justification for 
actions seemingly out 
of character for the 
fraud perpetrator. 
Non-observable Fraud scale: substituting 
integrity for 
rationalisation. 
More visible than 
rationalisation by 
observing 
decisions and 
decision-making 
processes to assess 
a person's 
integrity. 
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next section presents a review of the rules for internal and external auditors and forensic 
accountants. 
2.5 Internal and External Auditors  
Internal auditors play a significant role in auditing within their organisations 
(Rezaee, 2010).  According to Marks (2010), internal auditors are a collection of talented   
Source: Dorminey et al., (2010) 
persons within most organisations who have the ability to address directors’ needs for 
independent and objective assurance.  Internal auditing is a methodical process carried 
out by the specialised staff of an organisation and is intended to examine and estimate the 
adequacy and effectiveness of an organisation's systems for internal control (Abbott, 
Parker, and Peters, 2010).  According to the International Standards on Auditing (ISA 
610) ‘Using the Work of Internal Auditors’, the objectives of an internal audit are 
determined by management and those charged with governance.  Their function is an 
appraisal activity established as a service to the entity, including investigating, estimating  
and monitoring the efficiency of internal controls. 
Internal auditors are tasked with the following: (adapted from ISA 610): 
• Monitoring –  revising controls, examining their procedure and identifying 
developments.  
• Inspection of financial and operational information – analysis of the 
classification and reporting of financial information. 
• Evaluation of operational activities –reviewing the proficiency and 
effectiveness of operational activities. 
• Examination of compliance with rules and procedures –reviewing compliance 
with rules, procedures and organisation policies, and other internal necessities. 
• Risk management –supporting an administration by assessing extensive 
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exposures.  
The internal auditor is in a unique situation as a provider of both assurance 
services within an organisation and consultancy facilities to managers.  Internal auditors 
adopt a systematic, controlled approach to examine the efficiency of controls, the 
practicality of operations and governance procedures (Kueppers and Sullivan, 2010).  
Internal auditors have a strong sense of employee identity within organisations, which 
can be both an advantage and a disadvantage whereas external auditors worry that internal 
auditors lack objectivity, but their strong sense of identity can be an advantage in terms 
of the willingness of employees to share sensitive information during an investigation 
(Burt, 2016).    
External auditing standards require that external auditors should assess the nature, 
effectiveness, and scope of internal auditors’ fieldwork in audit preparation, and on that 
basis determine whether to depend on the work of internal auditors (Shu et al., 2011). 
External auditing is a methodical process to accurately obtain and estimate evidence 
relating to declarations concerning financial actions and events, and to determine the 
degree of correspondence between those declarations and established principles.  An 
organisation charged with conducting an external audit should be independent of the 
institution about which it is making such declarations (Council on Foundations, 2010).  
According to the Auditing Standards (SAS) No.65, when an external auditor reflects 
whether to depend on an internal auditor, then the external auditor must obtain an 
adequate assessment of the internal auditor role.  In fact, an external auditor must judge 
an internal auditor's capability and independence (Desai et al., 2011).  Also, SAS No. 99 
highlights that an “auditor may respond to an identified risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud by assigning a forensic specialist” (AICPA 2002). 
 According to Fram and Oliver (2010), an external auditor's purposes are to verify that 
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the following declarations are in the suitable form: 
• Financial Statements - profit and loss account, balance sheet statement, cash flow 
statement and statement of retained earnings 
• Organisation agreements 
• Auctions of main assets 
• Bonus outflows 
• Long-term tenancy arrangements 
External auditor's duty is to express an estimation of a company's financial 
statements and its control over financial reporting and to take into consideration numerous 
stages to assess a corporation’s business in order to classify the risks of material 
misstatement and to map and scope an audit.  These stages may involve consulting, for 
example, community records, historical company reports, and also evidence from outside 
predictors (Kueppers & Sullivan, 2010). 
2.6 The Role and Skills of Forensic Accountants  
Forensic accounting is defined as the practice of accounting, reviewing, and 
exploratory skills to support in lawful matters (Bressler, 2011).  Heitger and Heitger 
(2008) have proposed that forensic accounting is fraud discovery and deterrence, 
litigation provision and expert witnessing, and other analytical services.  A recent 
definition of forensic accounting that is appropriate for the purpose of this study is that 
forensic accounting is the triple preparation of utilising accounting, auditing and 
investigative skills to support in lawful issues (Olola, 2016).  
 Forensic accounting is linked with gathering and assessing monetary evidence 
for court (Rosen, 2006).  Forensic accounting deals with accounting evidence gathered 
through auditing processes to resolve legal issues, which are usually associated with 
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financial and assessment issues (Grippo, 2003). 
Forensic auditors have two main functions: (a) to engage in investigative 
accounting and identify fraudulent activity and (b) to provide litigation support by 
attending court as a skilled witness (Phillips, 2009).  Litigation support consist of business 
valuation, revenue analysis, expert witness testimony, and the evaluation of future 
earnings.  Interrogation skills are utilised in the process of gathering evidence of illegal 
conduct and validating or negating damages (Fillmer, 2003). 
The essential attributes of forensic accountants are being analytical, detail-
oriented and ethical (Rezaee, Lo, Ha, and Suen, 2016).  Forensic accounting requires a 
distinctive skill set and consists of techniques established uniquely for the purpose of 
identifying evidence of dishonesty.  The skills used by forensic accountants are both 
quantitative and qualitative in nature.  Quantitative skills are required for investigating 
the numbers to determine fraud, while qualitative skills are involved in being able to 
recognise how internal controls can be evaded in order to commit unlawful acts (Davis, 
Farrell, and DiGabriele, 2008).  Crumbley and Apostolou (2002) described the skills of a 
forensic auditor as follows: 
• A solid bookkeeping experience 
• A systematic awareness of auditing actions 
• An understanding of internal controls 
• Skills in fraud discovery procedures 
• An understanding of risk valuation 
• An understanding of the lawful environment 
• Effective communication abilities 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) described the 
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components of specialised forensic accountancy as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Forensic Accountants’ Areas of Specialised Forensic Knowledge  
Key: CFF – certified in financial forensics,  
         CPA – certified public accountant 
Source: Adapted from (Durkin and Ueltzen, 2009). 
Grippo (2003) argued that successful forensic accounting involves the following:  
• Teaching and training  
• Progressive and continued education in suitable disciplines, such as business 
evaluation 
• Differentiated accounting and auditing knowledge  
• Communication assistance – verbal and written  
• Applied business experience  
• Diversified forensic inspecting skill  
• Capability to work in a team situation  
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• Persons skills and elasticity 
Durkin and Ueltzen, (2009) suggested that the primary forensic accounting skills 
include the following:  
• Specialised responsibilities and practice administration  
• Regulation, court and argument resolution 
• Preparation and training 
• Evidence gathering and protection - documents, meetings/questionings, electronic 
data 
• Detection  
• Reportage, professionals, and witnesses  
• Financial statement falsifications  
• Fraud deterrence, discovery, and response  
In the view of Crumbley (2006), the characteristics of forensic accounting are like 
a three-layer wedding cake.  The first layer is a solid background in accounting.  The 
second layer is a deep background in investigative auditing experience.  The third layer 
is knowledge of the law and computer technique.  
The objectives of forensic accountants, as opposed to auditors, are detection, 
applying specialised inspection practices, and having a thorough understanding of the 
requirements of evidence and regulation.  Their responsibility is to classify patterns of 
abuse and they are tasked with the following (adapted from Bressler, 2011): (a) the 
consciousness of lawyers and juries in the law court system as to the importance of 
forensic auditor information of an accounting information system, (b) the ability to bring 
35 
 
clarity when appearing in fraud cases, and (c) understanding the accounting information 
systems which have been affected by deception.  Their level of skills determines their 
ability to adequately fulfil these key tasks as forensic accountants (Gbegi and Adebisi, 
2014).  In the following subsections, a review of audit processes versus forensic 
accounting and differences in the perception of fraud is presented. 
2.7 Audit Processes versus Forensic Accounting  
The work of auditors and forensic accountants has both similarities and 
differences (Tiwari and Debnath, 2017).  The procedures used by accountants differ from 
those used by forensic accountants when investigating the financial records of a company.  
According to Golden et al. (2006), while regular accountants and forensic accountants 
both seek to notice financial loss, either from mistakes and material misstatements or due 
to fraud, they have different purposes, values, and bases of evidence.  The objective of an 
accountant is to give an estimation concerning financial statements and the performance 
of the institution being audited, together with its financial situation.  In contrast, the 
objective of a forensic auditor is to determine whether a fraud has occurred and/or an 
intentional material misstatement.  Forensic accountants also prepare the necessary 
documents for presentation in courts for legal action (Matson, 2016).  Their work is used 
in courts as evidence, helping judges in making their decisions (Matarneh et al., 2015). 
The value of the accountant is to add consistency to a financial statement, whereas 
the value of a forensic accountant is to determine the facts and resolve doubts 
(Muhammad Zahirul et al., 2010).  An auditor uses observations and accounting 
transactions as sources of evidence, while a forensic investigator uses financial and non-
financial data, and conducts interviews, as further sources of evidence to determine the 
facts.  Unlike auditors, forensic accountants regularly spend weeks working on a case to 
arraign fraud.  Therefore, they should be well qualified in the rules of evidence, financial 
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statistics, and accounting information systems, in addition to being skilled in persuading 
a judge of their expertise (Muhammad Zahirul et al., 2010).  
Auditors have the capability to detect fraud, but they often lack the necessary 
skills and knowledge to translate this information into a plan that can aid in the future 
identification of risk factors facilitating fraudulent activities (Boritz et al., 2014).  This 
limitation can be addressed by forensic accountants whose skills in detecting fraud are 
considered more advanced than those of auditors (Matarneh et al., 2015).  Investigative 
skills and possession of a wide range of knowledge are essential to the work of forensic 
accountants (Matson, 2016).  According to Tiwari and Debnath (2017), forensic 
accounting is multi-disciplinary and encompasses a wide range of fields including 
auditing, accounting, legal rules, statistics, information technology, and human analytical 
skills.  When auditors can no longer perform a particular investigative task due to its 
complexity, the help of forensic accountants is often solicited (Matarneh et al., 2015). 
Forensic accountants go beyond the conventional methods used by auditors, making their 
work more comprehensive and exhaustive (Ahmed, 2016).  
2.8 Variation in the Perception and Investigation of Fraud  
Prior studies have shown that auditors and forensic investigators have different 
perceptions and processes in investigating fraud.  Harris and Brown (2000) argued that 
fraudulent cases regularly go unobserved by internal and external auditors, and may only 
become visible after considerable suffering is incurred.  Thus the roles and measures of 
accounting auditors and forensic auditors differ. 
Christensen et al. (2005) noted that according to specialised auditing standards, 
the auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to achieve reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether caused by error or fraud.  They added that a mistake in financial statements can 
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be an accidental mistake, while fraud is the real intent to cheat.  Additionally, many 
accounting auditors basically do not have the involvement and experience of how to find 
and detect fraud since they are not qualified in these matters.  Conversely, a forensic 
accountant plays an extensive role in investigating the financial information of a 
company, and Harris and Brown (2000, p. 6) stated that a ‘forensic accountant possess 
skills beyond those of a traditional auditor and delivers services outside the scope of a 
representative financial audit engagement.’  
A forensic accountant likewise looks for many other issues linked to fraud 
detection, including recognising income before it is received or the recording of fabricated 
revenues, shifting income to other periods, and not disclosing responsibilities owed by a 
company (Crumbley & Apostolou, 2002).  In contrast, auditors look for compliance with 
standards and regulations, and offer assurance services, in addition to having a 
responsibility to identify financial misstatement due to fraud.  Forensic accountants are 
frequently called in to examine and resolve doubts that financial misstatement due to 
deception has occurred (Golden et al., 2006). 
From the perspective of forensic accountants, Van Akkeren and Buckby (2015) 
found that fraud was perceived to be a result of strain and anomie.  The recruitment of 
deviant sub-groups and coercion of members to provide relief from strain were perceived 
by forensic accountants as determinants of fraud.  The results also revealed that the lack 
of adequate mechanisms for corporate governance provides an opportunity for fraudulent 
activities to occur.   
Investigative techniques are needed to address fraudulent activities in companies 
successfully (Dada, 2014).  Boritz et al. (2014) compared the investigative procedures 
used by auditors and forensic accountants and also compared their relative effectiveness. 
The results of the analysis revealed that fraud accountants and auditors generally use the 
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same number of procedures in assessing fraud.  The cumulative effectiveness of these 
procedures appears to be similar.  Fraud accountants, use more non-standard audit 
procedures, although these are only marginally more effective than the procedures 
typically used by auditors.  Despite these additional non-standard procedures, the 
resources needed to use these methods appear to be minimal, especially when compared 
to the budget proposals of auditors.         
2.9 Fraud Risk Valuation 
Fraud risk valuation is a complex process performed by auditors, requiring 
advanced cognitive skills (Desai & Gupta, 2016).  Fraud risk valuations assist an auditor 
in defining the nature and degree of the audit procedures required to increase the 
possibility of uncovering fraud (Bloomfield, 1997; Wuerges, 2011).  Fraud risk valuations 
also help in determining the appropriate procedure needed to conduct an audit (Gerson et 
al., 2006).  
Clements and Knudstrup (2016) examined the different fraud investigation 
procedures that are most often performed by fraud investigators.  The exploratory study 
involved the participation of 201 fraud investigators.  The results of the analysis revealed 
that the most frequently performed procedures used by fraud investigators were 
determining if management is overriding control and examining cancelled cheques and 
bank statements.  Other important procedures used to determine fraud included an 
examination of documents for erasures and alterations, examination of cancelled cheques, 
application of ratio and horizontal/vertical analysis, examination of expense invoices, and 
searching for unusual behaviours.    
Because of the advanced cognitive skills involved in fraud risk valuations (Desai 
& Gupta, 2016), many accountants are poor appraisers of fraud risk (Allen et al., 2006; 
Cushing et al., 1995; Knapp and Knapp, 2001).  Auditors are not conventionally trained 
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to handle fraud valuation (Asare et al., 2015).  Forensic experts handle fraud valuation 
because of the specialised training and knowledge they possess (Asare et al., 2015).  
Consequently, a number of researchers have focused on developing auditors' fraud 
risk valuation capabilities (Allen et al., 2006; Cushing et al., 1995; Patterson and Noel, 
2003).  Desai and Gupta (2016) contend that selective perceptions about the significance 
of situational factors such as opportunities and pressures can lessen the cognitive 
complexity of fraud risk valuation.  As a result, auditors are more likely to come up with 
an appropriate final valuation of fraud risk.    
Research studies have examined the effect of fraud risk valuation on the detection 
of fraud (Nahariah, 2011; Silver et al., 2008).  Some studies have shown the importance 
of forensic accounting in detecting fraud and in fraud risk valuation (Baird and Zelin, 
2009; Covaleski, 2003; Gottschalk, 2010).  Others have begun to examine the contrasts 
in fraud risk assessment execution between misrepresentation specialists and budgetary 
bookkeepers (Boritz et al., 2008; Rose et al., 2009). 
According to Palmrose (1987), measuring misrepresentation hazard as low when 
fraudulent activity is present makes an audit firm vulnerable to major losses, including 
claims, excessive settlements, and damage to reputation.  Jaffar et al. (2008) found that 
in a high fraud risk situation, an auditor's capability to measure fraud risk has a positive 
effect on their ability to notice the likelihood of fraud, whereas, in a low fraud risk 
situation, it does not.  Furthermore, Koonce (1993) argued that an analytical review 
should be used for planning purposes in order to identify high and low risk areas and to 
facilitate planning the nature, timing, and extent of other audit procedures.  Therefore, 
when assessing the fraud risk it is vital that auditors are capable of recognising when the 
danger of fraud is great. 
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2.10 Mental Representation  
Mental representation is the representation of a problem in the working memory 
of an individual, which determines the cognitive process for making sense of the 
information in a particular display format (Song, Chan, and Wright, 2016).  Mental 
representation allows individuals to produce a mental picture of how a specific task 
should be addressed and solved (Christ, 1993; Koonce, 1993).  Mental representation 
encompasses the current formulation or understanding of a mental situation (Sanford 
1985).  Koonce (1993) clarified that when attempting to form a mental image, an 
individual will use the available information to isolate relevant declarative and procedural 
knowledge1 stored in the long-term memory. 
Psychology research has revealed that the amount of domain-specific information 
influences the content and excellence of an individual's mental representations (Larkin 
1983; Glaser 1984).  Eventually, this procedure allows individuals to create a mental 
picture of the context, which helps them to concentrate and resolve a decision mission by 
recovering related information from earlier constructed mental issues (Glaser, 1984; 
Wyer and Srull, 1980). 
According to Pearson and Kosslyn (2015), mental representations can occur in 
different formats.  The more traditional view is that humans rely on propositional internal 
representations, where information is represented in terms of language that conveys 
verbal statements.  Another perspective on mental representation is that information is 
depictive, that is, it involves pictorial information, wherein functional space is considered 
when objects are represented in the mind.       
  
                                                 
1 Declarative knowledge involves information, for instance a sale recorded in the wrong period is a 
financial statement error, while procedural knowledge entails knowing how to do something, for 
example assess financial viability (Anderson, 1983). 
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Chen, Khalifa, and Trotman (2014) examined the impact of the mental 
representation of tasks from group brainstorming on accountants’ identification of 
potential frauds.  Mental representation was examined in terms of simultaneous and 
sequential unpacking of potential frauds.  The results of the experimental study revealed 
that among experienced auditors, sequential rather than simultaneous unpacking of the 
brainstorming tasks into several risk categories was more effective in influencing the 
identification of potential fraud.  The results also indicated that the positive effects of 
sequential unpacking persisted when other team members identified fraud.  However, one 
negative effect of sequential unpacking is the reduction of the level of professional 
scepticism.    
According to Boritz, Carnaghan, and Alencar (2014), the format of mental 
representation used by auditors can have an effect on their ability to assess risk.  When 
mental representations are applied in forensic accounting, forensic accountants may be 
more skilled than government auditors in the depiction of an effective fraud risk 
valuation.  Confirming this would necessitate examining whether different forensic 
accounting skills (high or low skills) lead to a different mental representation, which then 
impacts the government auditors' performances in fraud risk evaluation.  
2.11 Forensic Accounting Literature  
Forensic accounting is encouraged by numerous professional organisations and 
associations, and the top three accounting services which fall within the forensic 
accounting area are deception, litigation provision, and business evaluations (Covaleski 
2003).  A large number of studies have shown the importance of forensic accounting in 
the detection of fraud (Asare et al., 2015).  Baird and Zelin (2009) argued that forensic 
accounting is an important exploratory tool for the recognition of fraud.  Gottschalk 
(2010) acknowledged that the focus of forensic accounting is on evidence gathered 
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through the examination of documents.  In addition, they specified that forensic 
accounting is crucial to the legal system, through the provision of expert services, such 
as suspicious bankruptcy valuations, and the analysis of financial documents in fraud 
schemes. 
Salleh and Ab Aziz (2014) conducted an empirical study to explore the different 
traits, skills, and ethical values of forensic accountants in the public sector.  The sample 
consisted of professionals in the field of forensic accounting and individuals who employ 
their services, such as auditors and academicians.  The results of the analysis revealed 
that no particular coherent traits or relevant skills were agreed upon by the participants in 
the study, suggesting that the traits and skills of forensic accountants tend to be varied.         
Forensic accounting studies can be classified into three groups: studies that 
involve interest in the future of forensic accounting, studies highlighting audit processes 
versus forensic accounting; and studies that examine fraud detection by forensic 
accountants.  An evaluation of the literature reveals that forensic accounting plays an 
important role in today's business environment.  The majority of both researchers and 
consultants assume that future interest in forensic accounting will rise and increasing 
education is reported in this field (Rezaee, 2004).  A study conducted by Carpenter (2007) 
suggested there have been indications that the future call for auditing services will depend 
on an auditor’s ability to detect fraud, highlighting that forensic accounting procedures 
may represent a necessary addition to current auditors' expertise. 
A number of studies have focused on the rising demand for auditors to conduct 
forensic accounting activities (Baron, 2006; Cohen, Crain, & Sanders, 1996; Rezaee, 
Crumbley, and Elmore, 2004; Wells, 2003).  Some have shown the importance of forensic 
accounting in detecting fraud (Baird & Zelin, 2009; Covaleski 2003; Gottschalk, 2010), 
whilst others have focused on the delivery of forensic accounting education (Kleyman, 
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2006; Rezaee, 2004).  
Recognising the importance of forensic accounting and the need to develop the 
problem-solving skills necessary to determine and assess fraud, university leaders have 
started to offer courses in forensic accounting.  According to Lee, Cefaratti, and Green 
(2015), a course on forensic accounting is an extension of auditing, adding more emphasis 
on the detection and quantification of fraud.  Forensic accounting courses offered in 
universities also aim to improve the ability of students to understand the perspective of 
fraudsters (Lee et al., 2015).    
Several studies have been conducted to examine the role of forensic accounting 
in combating fraud, with most studies pointing to the effectiveness of forensic accounting 
skills as tools to detect financial crimes.  Ezejiofor, Nwakoby, and Okoye (2016) 
examined the effect of forensic accounting in fighting fraudulent activities in the Nigerian 
banking sector.  Data were collected using a survey questionnaire and the participants 
were 55 individuals from commercial banks in Nigeria.  The results of the data analysis 
indicated that forensic accounting is an effective tool for combating financial fraud in the 
banking sector.  The results also revealed that forensic audit could be instrumental in 
enhancing corporate governance.         
Kennedy and Anyaduba (2013) examined the effectiveness of forensic accounting 
in controlling financial fraud, financial reporting, and the quality of internal processes.  
The sample consisted of 143 different stakeholders such as accountants, company staff, 
and auditors, who were all asked to answer survey questionnaires.  The Binomial test was 
utilised as the data analysis strategy.  The results of the data analysis revealed that there 
was a consensus among the different participants that forensic accounting was effective 
in controlling financial fraud, financial reporting, and quality of internal processes. These 
findings highlight the relevance of forensic accounting in fraud detection and assessment 
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in the banking industry.   
Dada, Owolabi, and Okwu (2013) conducted a quantitative study to examine the 
effectiveness of forensic accounting in reducing fraudulent activities.  Multiple regression 
analysis was used to analyse the data collected from both survey questionnaires and 
interviews.  Data analysis revealed that the reduction of fraud is positively related to its 
detection as a result of the work of forensic accountants.  These findings highlight the 
significance of forensic accounting as a method of controlling fraudulent activities.    
Ahmed (2016) examined the effectiveness of forensic accounting in reducing 
fraudulent practices in the banking industry in Bangladesh.  The results revealed that 
forensic accounting was effective in reducing financial fraudulent activities by enhancing 
transparency, accountability and ethics. 
Research has also suggested that accountants’ attitude toward fraud differ across 
countries and culture. For instance, (Sean T, 2012) shows that firms headquartered in 
areas with strong religious social norms generally experience lower incidences of 
financial reporting irregularities.   
The researcher chose to test the skill of forensic accountants since this is an 
important factor determining the effectiveness of forensic accountancy.  Onodi, Okafor, 
and Onyali (2015) found that in order to be effective in reducing fraudulent practices in 
the banking sector, forensic accountants should have the appropriate skills.  Specifically, 
forensic accountants should have awareness and knowledge of the different methods that 
can be used to investigate fraudulent activities. 
This study is like other studies in the same field of fraud, auditors, and forensic 
accounting.  In his study "An Experimental Examination of The Effects of Fraud 
Specialist and Audit Mindsets On Fraud Risk Assessments And On The Development Of 
Fraud-Related Problem Representations", Chui (2010) examined fraud specialist and 
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audit mindsets regarding fraud risk assessment.  This study and Chui (2010) are similar 
and in the same field.  However, this study has used different variables: the independent 
variable of this study was "the interrogation and litigation categories of forensic 
accountant skills", unlike Chui, (2010) who used "audit mindsets" as an independent 
variable for his study.  Also, this study has used a different population, namely Dubai 
government auditors whereas Chui, (2010) used university students.  The purpose of this 
study was to examine if there was a significant difference in the fraud risk valuation and 
mental representation of government auditors who had low and high forensic accounting 
skills.  On the other hand, the purpose of Chui (2010) was to consider the effects of fraud 
specialist and audit mindsets on fraud risk assessment.  In addition, comparing this study 
with Chui (2010), they both have different understandings and explanations of the 
Theory.  Unlike Chui (2010), this study used fraud diamond theory (FDT) to provide 
frameworks to understand and explain the existence of fraud.  Specifically, the researcher 
hypothesized that well trained auditors in forensic accounting are a key factor in assessing 
fraud risk and in reducing opportunities for committing fraud, which is one of the corners 
of the fraud triangle.  This study builds on the opportunity angle.  Thus, forensic 
accounting and auditing are considered an essential part of the organisational structure 
which contributes to reducing fraud opportunities. 
Efiong, (2013), in his study "An exploration of forensic accounting education and 
practice for fraud prevention and detection in Nigeria", investigated how forensic 
accounting education would enhance fraud prevention and detection.  The objective of 
his study was to explore the level of awareness of forensic accounting techniques among 
practitioners of the accounting profession, students and academics.  Efiong’s, (2013) 
methodology was mixed method, using both oral interview as qualitative and descriptive 
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statistics as quantitative methods.  The methodology of this study, however, was purely 
quantitative.  
Leonard (2014) in his study "The Impact of Fraud Education on Fraud Detection" 
hypothesised that forensic students would be better able to detect fraud than the 
professional accounting students.  The population considered by Leonard, (2014) was 
graduate level professional accounting and forensic accounting students.  The study 
focused on the importance of discovering the value of a forensic degree and its impact on 
students’ ability to better detect fraud. The results of Leonard’s study showed a strong 
correlation between the effect of fraud training and a student’s performance on detecting 
fraud.  Although this study and Leonard’s study are in the same field of forensic 
accounting, they both have totally different objectives.   
A recent similar study is done by Popoola (2015) in "An empirical investigation 
of fraud risk assessment and knowledge requirement on fraud-related problem 
representation in Nigeria."  Although there are similarities in this study and that of 
Popoola, (2015), the purpose of the latter was to investigate fraud risk assessment task 
performance (TPFRA) and the knowledge requirement (KR) of the forensic accountant 
and auditor regarding fraud-related problem representation in the Nigerian public sector. 
Yet, this study was to examine if there was a significant difference in the fraud risk 
valuation and mental representation of government auditors who had low and high 
forensic accounting skills.  The respondents in Popoola’s study were auditors and forensic 
accountants in Nigeria’s public sector, whereas the respondents in this study were Dubai 
government auditors.  Unlike Popoola, (2015) who investigated the Knowledge 
Requirement (KR) of the forensic accountant and auditor regarding fraud-related problem 
representation, the researcher of this study examined forensic accounting skills among 
government auditors in Dubai, and the way these skills affected their performance in fraud 
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risk valuations. 
2.12 Audit Regulations – Dubai 
This section outlines the regulations that auditors in private and public sectors in 
Dubai have to follow, Law No. (4) of 2018, discusses Dubai’s legal governments 
requirements with regard public sector forensic audit. Also Federal Law No. 2 of 2015, 
is related to private sector audit requirements that apply on all UAE entities. 
First, Law No. (4) of 2018, replaces Law No 8 of 2010, regarding the 
establishment of the Financial Audit Authority (FAA). This law clarifies that the 
Financial Audit Authority (FAA) is tasked with controlling public funds, and its spending 
and management. The Authority also seeks to ensure that departments under the purview 
of this Law spend public funds efficiently and effectively. The Authority is also tasked 
with making sure that administrative decisions and processes conform to Dubai’s 
regulations and its high standards of transparency and integrity. The Authority is also 
responsible for investigating any financial or administrative irregularities discovered by 
the FAA or entities under its control, identifying the reasons behind it and taking 
appropriate actions. It is also tasked with ensuring that entities under the FAA’s control 
comply with regulations and policies; verifying the calculation and collection of public 
revenues and financial returns from the provision of services; ensuring that banks 
operating in Dubai adhere to regulations; and making sure that fees, prices, taxes, sales 
revenues, profits, etc. are correctly calculated as per the provisions of the regulation.  
It is important to highlight the government auditors are also responsible over 
auditing companies that are wholly owned by the Government or Companies in which 
the Government’s share is not less than 25 percent. 
Second, according to the Federal Law No (2) of 2015 on commercial companies, 
article 6 regarding the Corporate Governance in which it states the following:  
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1- With the exception of banks, financing companies, financial investment 
companies, exchange and money brokerage companies, the Minister shall 
issue the decisions which set the general framework regulating Governance in 
connection with private joint stock companies where the number of the 
shareholders therein exceeds 75- As for the Public Joint Stock Companies, the 
Chairman of the Authority shall issue the relevant Governance Decisions. 
 2- The Board of Directors of a company or its managers, depending on the 
circumstance, shall be responsible for the application of the rules and criteria of 
Governance. 
Article number 26- Accounting Records which states the following: 
1- Every company shall keep accounting records showing its transactions to 
accurately reveal at any time the financial position of the company and 
enabling the partners or shareholders to confirm that the accounts of the 
company are properly kept in accordance with the provisions of this Law.  
2- Every company shall keep its accounting books in its head office for a 
period of at least 5 (five) years from the end of the financial year of the 
company.  
3- The company may keep an electronic copy of the original of the 
documents and records kept and deposited therein in accordance with the 
controls issued by a Ministerial Decision. 
Article 102- Auditor of the Company which states the following: 
A Limited Liability Company shall have one or more auditors to be elected by 
the General Assembly of the partners every year and, other than as provided by 
Article 244 of this Law, the provisions concerning the auditors in public joint 
stock companies shall apply to the auditor of a Limited Liability Company. The 
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expression "Competent Authority" shall substitute the term "Authority" wherever 
it appears. 
2.13 Research Gap  
A review of literature reveals that forensic accounting plays an important role in 
today's business environment.  A majority of both academics and practitioners expect that 
future demand for and interest in forensic accounting will increase and many studies are 
reported in this field (Rezaee, 2004).  A study conducted by Carpenter (2007) suggests 
that there have been signs that the future demand for auditing services will be reliant upon 
the auditors' ability to detect fraud, and further highlights that forensic accounting 
procedures may represent an addition to a current auditor's expertise.  Briefly, a number 
of studies focused on the rising demand for auditors to conduct forensic accounting 
activities (Cohen, Crain, and Sanders, 1996; Baron, 2006; Wells, 2003; Rezaee, 
Crumbley, and Elmore, 2004).   
Studies discussed thus far are classified into three groups.  The first group consists 
of studies that examine the future demand for and interest in forensic accounting.  The 
second group consists of studies highlighting the audit processes versus forensic 
accounting.  The third group consists of studies that examine fraud detection by the 
forensic accountant.      
In addition, no study has been conducted to examine the components of forensic 
accounting skills to assess fraud risk appraisal. Further, the mediation variable has been 
tested for the first in UAE. 
Although, much has been done on forensic accounting and auditing performance, 
no study has been conducted regarding the relation between the forensic accounting skills 
and government auditor performance in fraud risk valuation in the context of Dubai. 
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2.14 Hypothesis Development and Research Framework  
According to Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007), researchers formulate a 
hypothesis to make a prediction about the results of a study based on previous research. 
Building on the literature on forensic accounting skills, mental representation, and fraud 
risk valuations (Bologna and Lindquist, 1987; Boritz et al., 2008; Chui, 2010; Enofe, 
2013; Bhasin, 2013; Popoola, 2014), the research framework shown in Figure 2.4 was 
developed by the current researcher.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Research Framework 
 
Figure 2.4 summarises the research model and hypotheses of the study.  Path 
diagram (H1) represents the direct effect of forensic accounting skills on fraud risk 
valuation.  Path diagram (H2) represents the effect of forensic accounting skills on audit 
mental representation and fraud mental representation.  Path diagram (H3) represents the 
effects of mental representation on fraud risk valuation for both low and high fraud case 
scenarios. 
Hypothesis 1: The first hypothetical relation in the research framework of this 
study signifies the researcher’s prediction that forensic accounting skills will have a direct 
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influence on a fraud risk valuation.  Based on the author’s actual experience, Davia (2000) 
highlighted how to perform detection procedures for every major type of fraud.  Prior 
literature concerning forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation recognised that 
auditors equipped with high forensic accounting skills are better able to discern fraud and 
to act as expert witnesses in court (Boritz, 2008; Wells, 2005; Popoola, 2014).  
On the other hand, an auditor’s skill is essentially to plan and perform an audit, to 
obtain reasonable assurance that financial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether caused by error or fraud.  In other words, auditors essentially do not have 
experience of how to find and detect fraud since they are not skilled in these matters 
(Christensen, 2005; Wells, 2005).  In addition, they have demonstrated that forensic skills 
are essential to detect fraud. While fraud risk assessors have the required skills, financial 
auditors do not have necessary skills; and therefore would not be able to perform their 
duties and discover fraud. 
Based on the above discussions, previous studies and literature, the following 
hypotheses are suggested: 
Hypothesis H1: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will 
measure fraud risk as greater in both high and low fraud risk scenarios compared to 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. 
Hypothesis H1 is extended to two sub-hypotheses as follows:  
 
H1(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure 
fraud risk in high fraud risk scenarios higher than government auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills. 
H1(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure 
fraud risk in low fraud risk scenarios higher than government auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills. 
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Hypothesis 2: The second hypothetical relation in the research framework of this 
study highlights that government auditors who are equipped with high forensic 
accounting skills will develop a mental representation that is dissimilar from that of 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills, Chui (2010).  It was predicted 
that government auditors with low forensic accounting skills would be likely to 
concentrate on information linked to whether a transaction was sustained by an 
appropriate audit track, and whether there were any substantial misstatements.  In 
contrast, a government auditor with high forensic accounting skills would be likely to 
concentrate on information linked to whether a transaction had really occurred, and if 
there were any misstatements in the financial statements Chui (2010).  Kadous and Sedor 
(2004) studied the use of mental representation with decision-making concepts to develop 
a cognitive framework for escalation-like behaviour among advisors.  They hypothesised 
that consultants who are required to recommend whether to continue or discontinue a 
project are more likely to acquire and retain in their memory information about critical 
threats to project viability compared to consultants who are not assigned a relevant 
purpose.  According to Boritz, Carnaghan, and Alencar (2014), the format of mental 
representation used by auditors can have an effect on their ability to assess risk.  When 
mental representations are applied in forensic accounting, forensic accountants may be 
more skilled than government auditors in the depiction of an effective fraud risk 
valuation. 
 Consequently, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis H2: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will 
develop a mental representation that is different from government auditors with low 
forensic accounting skills. 
Hypothesis H2 is extended to four sub-hypotheses as follows: 
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H2(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a 
fraud mental representation measured by a recall task higher than government 
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
H2(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a 
fraud mental representation measured by a memory recognition task higher than 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
H2(c): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an 
audit mental representation as measured by a recall task lower than government 
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
H2(d): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an 
audit mental representation as measured by a memory recognition task lower than 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. 
Hypothesis 3: The third hypothetical relation in the research framework of this 
study highlights that there is an intervening relation between forensic accounting skills 
and fraud risk valuation.  Literature has shown that the work of auditors and forensic 
accountants has both similarities and differences (Golden, Skalak, and Mona, 2006; 
Tiwari and Debnath, 2017).  The procedures used by accountants differ from those used 
by forensic accountants when investigating the financial records of a company.  
DiGabriele (2008), and Davis et al. (2010), claimed that special skills can produce a 
performance difference in decision making.  Therefore, it is hypothesised as follows:   
Hypothesis H3: Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud 
issues will assess fraud risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental 
representation in fraud issues, whereas, government auditors with high mental 
representation in audit issues will assess fraud risk valuation lower than auditors with 
high mental representation in fraud issues.   
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Therefore, H3 may be extended to two sub-hypotheses as follows: 
H3(a):  Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud issues will 
assess fraud risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental 
representation in fraud issues. 
H3(b): Government auditors with high mental representation in audit issues will 
assess fraud risk valuation lower than government auditors with high mental 
representation in fraud issues.   
Hypothesis 4: As previously mentioned, Boritz, Carnaghan, and Alencar (2014), 
argued that the format of mental representation used by auditors can influence their ability 
to assess risk.  When mental representations are applied in forensic accounting, forensic 
accountants may be more skilled than government auditors in the depiction of an effective 
fraud risk valuation.  The researcher posits that mental representation would be a potential 
mediator variable between the skills of forensic accounting and fraud risk valuation.  If 
the mediation were confirmed, the researcher would conclude there is no direct 
relationship between the two variables.  Thus, the following Hypothesis is suggested:  
Hypothesis H4: Mental representation mediates the connection between forensic 
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation.  
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CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the research methodology used in this study will be thoroughly 
detailed.  The main procedure used to test the study hypotheses is outlined, together with 
the development and validation process for the instrument utilised.  This study has 
hypothesised that there is both a direct and indirect (through the mediator, mental 
representation) effect between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation. 
3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The researcher would like to highlight that the current research uses litigation and 
interrogation skills of forensic accounting as construct components for forensic 
accounting skills (Fillmer 2003; Phillips 2009). 
The research questions of the study are the following:  
RQ1: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills measure 
fraud risk as greater, in both high and low fraud risk scenarios, compared to government 
auditors with low forensic accounting skills? 
RQ2: Will government auditors with high forensic accounting skills develop a 
mental representation that is different from government auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills? 
RQ3: Does mental representation mediate the connection between forensic 
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation? 
Based on the three research questions of the study, the corresponding hypotheses 
are the following: 
H1: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure fraud 
risk as greater in both high and low fraud risk scenarios compared to government auditors 
with low forensic accounting skills. 
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H2: Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will develop a 
mental representation that is different from government auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills. 
H3: Government auditors with a high mental representation in fraud issues would 
assess fraud risk higher in both low and high fraud risk scenarios.  Government auditors 
with a high mental representation in audit issues would assess fraud risk lower in both 
low and high fraud risk scenarios.  
H4: Mental representation mediates the connection between forensic accounting 
skills and fraud risk valuation. 
3.3 Nature of the Study    
A quantitative research method was utilised for this study.  The sample consisted 
of 96 government auditors from the Financial Audit Department (FAD) located in Dubai. 
Data for this study was collected with an Investigation instrument.  The study variables 
include the independent variable of forensic accounting skills (both categories 
interrogation and litigation), the dependent variable of fraud risk valuation, and the 
possible mediator variable of mental representation.  In stage 1 of the study, forensic 
accounting skills (the independent variable) were measured by asking questions 
concerning both litigation and interrogation forensic accounting skills.  In stage 2, the 
researcher measured fraud risk valuation (the dependent variable) through a case 
concerning Lakeview Lumber Inc.  In stage 3, the mediator variable, mental 
representations, was measured by participants performing a recall task requiring them to 
list all the significant information that they could recall about the Lakeview case.  In 
further measuring of the mediator variable, mental representations, participants undertook 
a memory recognition assessment containing ‘true or false’ questions related to the case. 
Finally, stage 4 consisted of demographic enquiries.  During the data analysis, an 
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independent T-test, Pearson correlation analysis, and also regression analysis were 
employed to test Hypotheses One and Two, whilst regression analysis following the steps 
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) was used to test mediation hypotheses.   
3.4 Instrumentation and Operationalisation of the Constructs 
Survey designs are suitable for describing and associating the trends within a 
population (Creswell, 2002).  The purpose of this survey was clearly detailed to encourage 
respondents (government auditors) to provide correct answers to the survey questions.  
Respondents were assured of the privacy of their answers and that all responses would 
remain anonymous.  The survey questions were kept brief to enhance the response rate 
and the understanding of the expected respondents.  An advantage to limited questions is 
that respondents are more likely to answer a question thoughtfully, rather than purely 
filling in a questionnaire to please a researcher.  
To achieve the objectives of the study, it was essential to categorise the research 
respondents as either a government auditor with high forensic accounting skills or as 
government auditor with low forensic accounting skills.  The method of categorising was 
based on the prior literature on forensic accounting skills (Bologna and Lindquist, 1987; 
Fillmer, 2003; Coulbert, 2004; Enofe, 2013; Bhasin, 2013; Astutie, and Utami, 2013), in 
which it is asserted that forensic accounting as a discipline incorporates information of 
the legal system and investigatory activities. 
Curtis (2008) argued that one of the more common uses of forensic accounting is 
in the examination and prosecution of deception, highlighting that forensic accounting is 
crucial to the legal system by providing skilled services, such as net worth assessments 
in separation proceedings, asset evaluations in liquidation matters, financial statement 
analysis in securities and tax cases, and the analysis of financial papers in deception 
schemes.  Litigation support consists of business evaluation, revenue investigation, being 
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a skilled witness, and future pay cheques evaluation, while investigative accounting is the 
procedure of gathering evidence of illegal conduct, and verifying or disproving damages 
(Fillmer, 2003). 
Four investigational stages were carried out to establish the validity of the research 
instrument.  After choosing questions to test litigation and interrogation forensic 
accounting skills, a group of specialists was formed with the intent of validating whether 
these questions precisely depicted the skills of forensic accounting.  Various professionals 
were asked to provide their opinions, based on the standards proposed by Bologna and 
Lindquist (1987), which included the experts' identifications, licensure, and authorisation, 
as well as writing and publications in their field of proficiency.  Table 3.1 shows details 
of the group of specialists.  
Table 3.1: Specialists Group 
Deception/ Forensic Specialists 
Expert 1 – A Professor in the Faculty of Business and a former Chairman of the 
Department of Accounting at the University of Jordan with more than 10 years’ 
experience 
Expert 2 – A Senior Financial Controller (MSc., MBA, Ph.D., PDD, CMA, CFM) 
with more than 10 years’ experience 
Audit Specialists 
Expert 3 – A Director General of the Financial Audit Department with more than 
35 years’ experience 
Expert 4 – An audit manager with 8 years’ experience 
 
The group of specialist's panel consisted of experts in either the deception/forensic 
or the auditing field.  Four specialists were referred to during the expansion of the 
valuation of forensic accounting skills.  The researcher first described the study and its 
objectives to the specialists and then outlined the initial key forensic accounting skills 
that had been identified in the literature.  The group of specialists were asked to provide 
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their opinions on whether the questions posed provided a satisfactory representation of 
their respective professions and to add any further questions relevant to the skills of 
forensic accounting.  In addition, the experts were asked to help with the information to 
classify participants’ recall, concerning inspection-related matters, possible fraud-related 
matters, and case facts.  
3.5 Measurement of the Research Framework Variables  
The methodology of this study includes 4 investigational stages to measure the research 
variables as detailed below. 
3.5.1 Stage I: 
In the first stage, the independent variable forensic accounting skills is measured 
where the 96 government auditors were categorised either with high forensic accounting 
skills or with low forensic accounting skills.  
When measuring forensic accounting skills, the attention was on questions that 
tested both litigation and interrogation constructs of forensic accounting skills; these 
questions were based on Bremser (1995), as well as experts’ opinions as described 
previously.  Based on Reimers et al., 1993, twenty (20) questions were employed to test 
forensic accounting skills, and the participant received one point for each correct response 
and zero for an incorrect answer; thus, the total scores for the forensic accounting skills 
test would range starts from zero up to twenty.  Ten questions tested litigation skills and 
the other ten questions tested interrogation skills.  Litigation questions 1, 9, and 10 relate 
to the expert witness aspect of litigation skills; for example:  
The forensic accountant work as an expert usually results in a written report that 
typically includes all the following except..... 
Litigation questions 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 relate to the collection of evidence part of litigation 
skills; for example: 
The primary person responsible for collecting the actual evidence to be 
60 
 
introduced in court is…. 
Litigation questions 3 and 4 relate to the business evaluation part of litigation skills; for 
example: 
To be awarded damages for lost profits in contract disputes or civil actions, the 
three basic elements that must be proven include all the following except   . 
Interrogation questions 1, 2, and 4 relate to the interrogation process part of interrogation 
skills; for example: 
In a forensic accounting investigation, the accountant does which of the 
following?....  
Interrogation questions 8, 9, and 10 relate to the substantiating or disproving damages 
part of interrogation skills; for example: 
An inappropriate way to accuse a suspect is to ask…. 
 Interrogation questions 3, 5, 6 and 7 relate to the interview part of interrogation skills; 
for example: 
The advantages of going to the interviewee's location are that….  
This stage enabled the researcher to measure the variables forensic accounting skills 
(litigation); forensic accounting skills (interrogation); and the overall forensic accounting 
skills which is the aggregate of the two variables. 
3.5.2 Stage II: 
In the second stage, the researcher used the Lakeview Lumber Inc. case study to 
measure the level of performance of the government auditors in fraud risk valuation in 
both high and low fraud risk scenarios.  The case study was adapted from Lindberg 
(1999)2.  In fact, the researcher selected this case because of its similarity to many recent 
fraud cases in Dubai.  Similar many cases, as mentioned earlier, the Dubai public 
                                                 
2 The researcher requested and received approvals from the original authors to use the case 
(Lakeview Lumber Inc) and the questions to test forensic accounting skills (appendix d); also the same 
instrument was used by Chui (2010) to determine the effects of mind-set on fraud risk assessment.  
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prosecutor in 2009 indicted numerous businesspersons and former bank executives on 
charges of bribery and corruption, alleging that they had defrauded the Dubai Islamic 
Bank of more than AED 1.84 billion.  Analysts note that regulation in Dubai has failed to 
keep up with the rapid growth in business (Sleiman, 2009).  
3.5.2.1 Description of the Lakeview Lumber Inc. case study 
In the case of the Lakeview Lumber Inc, the management had committed fraud in 
order to get bonuses built on net profits, so that the case would contain elements of the 
fraud-triangle as defined by SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2002).  Therefore, participants had to 
assign either a high or low fraud risk valuation.  For the purpose of this study, the 
researcher revised Lindberg's (1999) case as described below. 
As data collection for this study took place in 2015, the years of the financial 
statements in the case were altered from 2006 audited, 2007 audited, and 2008 unaudited, 
to 2011 audited, 2012 audited, and 2013 unaudited, and the modification in the accounts 
of bad debt and warranty provisions were for the year 2013. 
The case’s financial statements3 were also adjusted, particularly in the high-risk 
scenario, where both the bad debt provisions and the product warranties were altered to 
show that these accounts were intentionally understated to inflate the reported net profits.  
According to SAS No. 99, examples of fraud risk factors include significant portions of 
their compensation, such as bonuses, stock options, and earn-out arrangements being 
contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial 
position, or cash flow’4 (AICPA, 2002).  For the low risk scenario, the accounts were 
modified but not understated, and these accounts were made comparable to the audited 
                                                 
3 The financial statements were adapted from Lindberg (1999). 
4 Management incentive plans may be contingent upon achieving targets only to certain accounts or selected 
activities of the entity, even though the related accounts or activities may not be material to the entity 
(AICPA, 2002). 
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financial statements of the previous two years. 
In the high-risk scenario, the bad debts expense as a percentage of credit sales was 
approximately 3 percent for FY2013, whereas in the previous two years it was 5.0 percent 
for both FY2012 and FY2011.  However, in the low risk scenario the bad debts expense 
as a percentage of credit sales was approximately 4.7 percent for FY2013, and in the 
previous two years was 5.0 percent for both FY2012 and FY2011.  Given that the 
geographic location for this study was the FAD, the currency was changed from US 
Dollars to UAE Dirhams (AED) to make it easier for the participants to understand.  
In addition, different information was given to the participants concerning the 
management team (controller, accounting manager), managerial compensation and 
accounting environment.  For instance, participants in the high fraud risk scenario 
received the information that the controller, John, usually arrives at work in his Ferrari 
sports car and that he and his wife have recently taken out a loan to purchase a new home 
in an elegant neighbourhood.  In contrast, in the low risk scenario participants received 
the information that the controller, John, usually arrives at work in his old car and he and 
his wife have recently been saving money to remodel their old home.  
The case includes the following: (1) background information on the company; (2) 
key personnel and the managerial compensation schedule; (3) the accounting 
environment of the company; (4) currently unresolved audit issues involving bad debt 
provisions and product warranties; and (5) the company's reported financial statements.  
Half of the government auditors with high forensic skills, selected randomly, were 
presented with a high fraud risk scenario and the other half with a low fraud risk scenario. 
Similarly, half of the auditors with low forensic skills were presented with the same high 
fraud case and the half low forensic skills auditors were presented low fraud risk 
scenarios.  After the participant had examined the updated Lakeview Lumber Inc. case, 
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government auditors were presented with a set of questions related to the examined case 
(either a low fraud risk scenario or a high fraud risk scenario).  For each question the 
respondent weighted his/her answer from 0 to 10.  However, the researcher has used only 
the results from three questions’ scores namely questions 5, 6 and 7 as a measure for fraud 
risk valuation: 
Question 5: Regarding the information you have reviewed about the case, how 
probable do you think it is that fraud has occurred in Lakeview’s bad debt expense 
account? 
Question 6: Based on all the information you have reviewed about the case, how 
probable do you think it is that fraud has occurred in Lakeview's product 
warranties expense account? 
Question 7: Considering the information you have reviewed about the case, what 
is your evaluation of the total fraud risk for this customer? 
 According to Chui (2010) these are the questions that capture the level of 
performance of the participants in assessing either a high fraud risk valuation or a low 
risk valuation. The goal of this investigation was to compare the two groups: auditors 
with high forensic accounting skills to auditors with low forensic accounting skills in 
assessing both the high and low fraud risk scenarios.  
This stage enabled the researcher to measure variable high/low fraud risk 
valuation and classified the 96 respondent auditors into four groups: 
Group 1: Auditors with high forensic skills assessed with a high fraud risk scenario (26 
auditors). 
Group 2: Auditors with low forensic skills assessed with a high fraud risk scenario (24 
auditors). 
Group 3: Auditors with high forensic skills assessed with a low fraud risk scenario (24 
auditors). 
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Group 4: Auditors with low forensic skills assessed with a low fraud risk scenario (22 
auditors). 
3.5.3 Stage III 
In this stage, the investigation task consisted of a recall and memory recognition 
exercise which was adapted from the research instrument of Kadous and Sedors (2004).  
Participants were asked to perform a recall test by listing all the important information 
from the Lakeview case.  They were then instructed to complete a memory recognition 
test that contained both factual and false positive statements (sentences indicating matters 
that do not exist in the experimental case).  Participants were required to evaluate the 
statements and to indicate whether they remembered reading such information in the 
investigational case.  Specifically, they were instructed to respond by choosing either yes 
(indicating that they remembered reading the information in the case) or no (indicating 
that they did not remember reading such information in the case). 
In this stage, the researcher measured variable auditors’ mental representation by 
presenting the following tasks to the government auditors:  
3.5.3.1 Recall task: Government auditors were asked to list the important information 
that they could remember about the Lakeview case; the information stated was 
categorised by the researcher as relating to either audit or to fraud issues.  
3.5.3.2 Memory recognition task: Government auditors were also set a memory 
recognition test consisting of true/false questions relevant to the Lakeview case.  There 
were ten statements in the memory recognition task: four statements - 1, 6, 8 and 10 - 
were fraud related (for example, Lakeview has some slight issues with its accounting 
system), four statements - 2, 4, 7 and 9 - were audit related (for example, all audit samples 
were sustained by proper papers) and the remaining two statements - 3 and 5 - were false 
sentences (for example, Lakeview gives its administration stock options as an inducement 
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to meet earnings).  No performance difference between the government auditors with 
either high or low forensic accounting skills were expected in answering the false 
sentences.  
During this investigational Stage, four main variables are measured: Fraud recall 
issues, Audit recall issues, Fraud memory issues and Audit memory issues.  
The summary of the research variables as measured by the above three investigational 
stages are listed in table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of the Research Variables. 
 
3.5.4 Stage IV: 
After the respondents – government auditors - had ended the investigational examination, 
they were asked about: (i) gender, (ii) age, (iii) whether a participant had received training 
in forensic accounting, and (iv) if the participants held a professional degree in forensic 
accounting/fraud investigation. Besides, demographic information, the auditors had the 
N0 Variable Name Measurement Stage Subjects 
Stage I 
1.a Litigation forensic accounting skills 10 litigation questions I All auditors  
1.b Interrogation forensic accounting 
skills   
10 interrogation questions I All auditors  
1.c Forensic accounting skills 1.a+1.b I All auditors  
Stage II 
2.a High forensic skills auditors high 
fraud risk valuation 
Auditors with high forensic 
skill assessed with high 
fraud risk scenario  
 
  II 
  26 auditors, 
group 1 
2.b High forensic skills auditors low 
fraud risk valuation  
Auditors with high forensic 
skill assessed with low fraud 
risk scenario 
 
II 
24 auditors, 
group 3 
2.c Low forensic skills auditors high 
fraud risk valuation 
Auditors with low forensic 
skill assessed with high 
fraud risk scenario  
 
  II 
24 auditors, 
group 2 
2.d Low forensic skills auditors low 
fraud risk valuation 
Auditors with low forensic 
skill assessed with low fraud 
risk scenario 
 
  II 
22 auditors, 
group 4 
Stage III 
3.a.1 Fraud recall by high forensic skill 
auditors 
 
 
Recall task 
 
III 50 auditors 
group 1 + group 2 
3.a.2 Audit recall by high forensic skill 
auditors 
III 50 auditors 
group 1 + group 2 
3.a.3 Fraud recall by low forensic skill 
auditors 
III 46 auditors 
group 1 + group 2 
3.a.4 Audit recall by low forensic skill 
auditors 
III 46 auditors 
group 3+ group 4 
3.b.1 Fraud memory by high forensic skill 
auditors 
 
 
 
 
Memory recognition task 
 
III 50 auditors 
group 1 +group2 
3.b.2 Audit memory by high forensic skill 
auditors 
III 50 auditors 
group1 +group2 
3.b.3 Fraud memory by low forensic skill 
auditors 
III 46 auditors 
group1 +group2 
3.b.4 Audit memory by high forensic skill 
auditors 
III 46 auditors 
group 3+group 4 
3.c.1 Fraud recall issues 3.a.1+3.a.3 III All auditors 
3.c.2  Audit recall issues 3.a.2+3.a.4 III All auditors 
3.c.3 Fraud memory issues 3.b.1+3.b.3 III All auditors 
3.c.4 Audit memory issues 3.b.2+3.b.4 III All auditors 
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opportunity to make comments concerning the task. 
3.6 Population and Sample   
The geographical location for the study was the Financial Audit Department 
(FAD) located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.  The required sample size for the study 
was determined through an examination using G*Power procedure.  The sample size was 
considered based on Cohen’s effect size.  A control of 0.80 is normally utilised in 
quantitative research to give compelling numerical outcomes (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and 
Buchner, 2009), and a medium impact size was utilised as a part of the power 
investigation with the goal that it was neither strict nor permissive.  An a priori power 
examination was conducted using the statistical test of linear regression analysis with two 
predictors (forensic skills as an independent variable and mental representation as a 
dependent variable), a statistical power of 0.8, a medium effect size of 0.15, and a level 
of significance of 0.05, which produced a least sample size of 55 responses (see Appendix 
A).  This indicates that 55 different sets of data for the different study variables relating 
to government auditors from the FAD represents the minimum sample size to attain the 
required statistical power for a quantitative study of 80 percent.  Therefore, a sample of 
96 government auditors from the FAD was chosen to participate in this study. 
G*Power software was utilised to determine the appropriate sample size, offering 
an accessibility advantage, higher speed, and a lower cost to recruit sample study 
participants (Coy, 2008).  Also, this method of sampling was chosen because the study 
participants needed to match a specific set of inclusion criteria for them to be eligible for 
participation in the study. 
3.7 Study Participants  
Financial Audit Department in Dubai (FAD) auditors were preferred as the study 
population because they undertake financial audit tasks for the following: (Financial 
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Audit Department, 2013):  
• Government Departments, Public Corporations and Establishments, and 
Authorities including Free Zone Authorities and any other entity belonging to the 
Government. 
• Companies wholly owned by the Government or Companies in which the 
Government’s share is not less than 25 percent. 
• Companies that the Government guarantees a minimum limit of profit, or any 
entity for which the Government provides a financial subsidy. 
• Any other entity or project, the Ruler or the Chairman of the Executive Council 
assigns to the Department the Audit of its accounts. 
In addition, the use of government auditors as the population for this study was 
consistent with the point of view of Peecher and Solomon (2001) and Libby et al. (2002). 
On the both studies, they prompted examiners to attach themes to the targets of the study.  
The principal goal of this study was to examine how forensic accounting skills affect audit 
performance in fraud risk valuation.  
3.8 Research Method and Design  
A quantitative methodology was appropriate for investigating the research 
questions, as it employs a mathematical approach to the collection and analysis of data.  
Quantitative methodology is used to measure the research objectives mathematically, 
through collecting information from a large sample, using survey methods and utilising 
mathematical models (Gilbert, 2001).  This study used a quantitative method since this 
‘asks specific, narrow questions to obtain measurable and observable data on variables’.  
In contrast, a qualitative method discovers broad, general questions correlated to a central 
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phenomenon and necessitates the analysis of the data for descriptions (Creswell, 2005). 
A quantitative research approach is appropriate when the intent is ‘a description 
of trends or an explanation of the relationship among variables’. The second emphasis of 
quantitative research includes collecting data that measures attributes of individuals 
(Creswell, 2005).  The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine if there was a 
substantial difference in the fraud risk assessment and mental representation of 
government auditors who had low and high forensic accounting skills.  The study also 
examined the role of mental representation in the connection between forensic accounting 
skills and fraud risk valuation by government auditors. 
This study tested the hypotheses by varying both forensic accounting skills (either 
high or low skill) and fraud risk evaluation (either high or low) at both stages.  Research 
participants were assigned to either high or low forensic accounting skills, depending on 
their results from the sections of the questionnaire that tested their forensic accounting 
skills in both litigation and interrogation.  Also the researcher manipulated the fraud risk 
valuation by providing participants with a case scenario.  The complete research 
instrument is presented in Appendices D and E.  
3.9 Data Collection Procedure  
3.9.1 Informed Consent  
The consent form stated the research title and purpose of the study and is shown 
in Figure 3.1.  The form also stated that the names of the research participants would 
remain anonymous, and that participants would be able to complete the survey at their 
place of work and at a time convenient to them (Appendix B).  Respondents had the 
opportunity to withdraw from the study at any time during the data collection process by 
discontinuing the questionnaire.  
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Figure 3.1: Consent statement 
3.9.2 Pilot Testing  
Pilot studies are essential to the examination procedure (Van Teiijlingen, Rennie, 
Hundley, and Graham, 2001).  According to Saunders et al. (2009), a pilot study allows 
an investigator to test a questionnaire’s validity and the likely reliability of the 
information that will be collected.  The research instrument was pilot tested using 20 
government auditors, with the aim of ensuring that the examination categorisation (high 
forensic accounting skills and low forensic accounting skills), as well as the high and low 
fraud risk scenarios, operated as planned.  The result of the pilot test confirmed that they 
were as planned. 
In the light of the results of the pilot study, some amendments were made to the 
investigational instrument.  Alterations were made to the arrangement of the precise types 
of information to be remembered by the government auditors in the recall assignment and 
in the phrasing of the questionnaire.  It was predicted that government auditors with low 
I have been given information about the study entitled "Skills Of 
Forensic Accounting and Fraud Risk Assessment" and debated the research 
plan with the investigator Abdulla Yaser Amiri, who is conducting this 
research as part of his Doctor of Business Administration degree, supervised 
by Dr. Munir Lutfi (Business and Management Department); Dr. Tchan Latif 
(Engineering and Information Sciences Department) at the University of 
Wollongong in Dubai. 
I have been directed of the possible risks associated with this research, 
and been informed that any data personally linked to my responses will be 
removed. I have had the opportunity to ask Abdulla Yaser Amiri any questions 
I may have around the research and my partaking. 
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forensic accounting skills would be likely to concentrate on whether a matter was 
recorded using an appropriate audit track, and if there were any substantial misstatements. 
Regarding government auditors with high forensic accounting skills their focus was 
predicted to be on whether a matter had really occurred, and if there were any 
misstatements in the financial statements.  Thus, it was anticipated that government 
auditors with high forensic accounting skills would recall fewer materiality-related items 
compared to those with low forensic accounting skills, while government auditors with 
low forensic accounting skills would recall more audit-related items than those with high 
forensic accounting skills (Chui, 2010).   
The pilot study provided the author with very important feedback. According to 
the pilot study outcomes, a correction was made for the wording and nature of information 
for assessing recall by government auditors. In addition, one more case fact was added.  
The revised information categories in the recall task were audit-related issues, fraud-
related issues, and case-related issues. No performance differences between the 
governments auditors with either high or low forensic accounting skills were expected for 
the case-related issues.  In addition, based on the comments received from participants, 
the wording of the questionnaire was simplified so that it could be understood by all 
participants. 
3.10 Data Collection  
Initially, potential participants were approached and informed about the project 
via a letter from the head of the FAD.  Subsequently, the researcher sent an e-mail 
message to the study respondents clarifying how the results of the survey would be used, 
the importance of the project for on-going social change, and the duration of the current 
research.  The e-mail message described the statistics gathering timeline, the process for 
completing the examinations, the need for truthful evaluations, and an approximation of 
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the amount of time the survey would take.  The e-mail message also expressed gratitude 
to the study respondents for their participation. 
Data were downloaded into a Microsoft Excel format for analysis using the SPSS 
statistical analysis software programme.  Data were saved on a password protected 
UOWD computer, which was backed up to the UOWD servers.  The researcher was the 
only person with access to the data.  The data will be held until this thesis has been 
examined, and then deleted, although it will remain on the UOWD server for five years. 
The investigations of the research framework had four stages.  During stage 1 
forensic accounting skills (the independent variable) were measured via questions 
concerning both litigation and interrogation forensic accounting skills.  In stage 2 fraud 
risk valuation (the dependent variable) was measured through an experimental case 
concerning the company Lakeview Lumber Inc.  In stage 3, the potential mediator 
variable for fraud mental representation and audit mental representation were measured 
on participants performing a recall task requiring them to list all of the significant 
information that they could recall about the Lakeview case; further measuring of the 
mediator variable, mental representation, was undertaken and participants undertook a 
memory recognition assessment containing true-or-false enquiries related to the 
Lakeview case study.  Finally, stage 4 consisted of demographic enquiries.  
3.11 Ethical Considerations  
Several steps were taken to ensure that ethical procedures were followed during 
this study.  All information collected was kept confidential, and all participants were 
treated equally, with respect paid to individual values and beliefs.  In addition, 
participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time.  Informed consent was 
obtained from all the respondents prior to taking part in the study.  The researcher gave 
the participants information about how the data would be used and what would be done 
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with the case materials.  The University of Wollongong Research Ethics Committee 
approved the study; ethics number HE13/246 (Appendix C). 
3.12 Summary  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine if there was a significant 
difference in the fraud risk assessment and mental representation of government auditors 
who had low and high forensic accounting skills.  The study also examined the role of 
mental representation in the relationship between the forensic accounting skills and fraud 
risk assessment of government auditors.  The sample were government auditors from the 
FAD located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.  The data for the study were collected using 
survey instruments.  The study variables are the independent variable of forensic 
accounting skills, the dependent variable of total fraud risk assessment, and the mediator 
of mental representation.  The data analyses conducted are an independent T-test and 
Pearson correlation analysis and regression analysis to test hypotheses one and two and 
regression analysis following the steps of Baron and Kenny (1986) to test hypothesis 
three.  Chapter 4 provides the results of the analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – RESULTS and ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter delivers a comprehensive description of the outcomes after using the 
investigational instrument with government auditors in Dubai.  It contains descriptive 
statistics of the participants and measured variables, correlation between litigation and 
interrogation skills of forensic accounting, testing hypothesis H1, testing hypothesis H2, 
testing hypothesis H3, and testing Mediation. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Demographic Data 
A total of 96 Dubai government auditors participated in this study and the research 
instrument was administered at the Financial Audit Department.  Demographic 
information relating to the government auditors is shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Number of participants N = 96 
Gender 
Male: N=36; 37.5% 
Female: N=60; 62.5% 
Age 
Mean= 34.32 
SD= 6.22 
Participants with training in forensic 
accounting 
N=25; 26% 
 
Participants with professional degree in 
forensic accounting/fraud investigation 
N= 18; 18.75% 
Table 4.1: Summary of Sample Statistics 
Male respondents signified a smaller proportion of the sample (37.5 percent, n = 
36) than female (62.5 percent, n = 60).  The average age of the respondents (government 
auditors) was 34.32 years old (SD = 6.22).  73.9 percent of the participants had no 
previous forensic accounting/fraud or investigation training and only 18.75 percent of the 
participants had a professional degree in forensic accounting/fraud investigation. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Stage I measured variables 
  
Government auditors are classified either as having high or low forensic 
knowledge based on the aggregate of the total litigation and the total interrogation scores.  
50 auditors were classified as possessing high forensic knowledge and 46 auditors with 
low forensic knowledge.  Table 4.2 below presents the average scores of the measured 
variable for both type of auditors: 
Table 4.2: Average Scores of Forensic Accounting Skills 
Skill Category Auditors with high forensic skills Auditors with low forensic skills 
Litigation 6.90 3.91 
Interrogation 9.08 2.65 
 
The correlation between litigation and interrogation scores is 0.77 for Spearman using 
ranked data and 0.84 for Pearson.  Hence the two variables’ scores were aggregated into 
a single variable.  
4.3.1 Forensic skill categorised by gender 
36 out of 60 females (57 percent) are classified as auditors with a high forensic skill 
compared with 20 males out of 46 (44 percent).  A Box plot shown in Figure 4.1 (a) 
reveals that the median in forensic knowledge skills is higher for females than males. The 
box plot in figure 4.1 (b) reveals that the median in forensic skills is much higher for those 
auditors with age greater than 36. Thus, as expected the more the age, the more experience 
in forensic accounting the more forensic skills. 
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             Figure 4.1: Box Plot Comparing Forensic Accounting Skills as function of Gender and Age 
 
 
 
4.4 Analysis of Hypothesis: H1 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Research Framework Hypothesis 1 
As depicted in Figure 4.2, hypothesis H1 tests the researcher’s prediction that 
forensic accounting skills will have a direct influence on fraud risk assessment: 
government auditors with high forensic accounting skills assess significantly higher the 
likelihood of fraud in both high and low fraud risk scenarios (bad debt expense and 
product warranties expense accounts).  
Hypothesis H1 is extended to two sub-hypotheses as follows:  
 
H1(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure 
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fraud risk in a high fraud risk scenario higher than government auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills. 
H1(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills will measure 
fraud risk in low fraud risk scenario higher than government auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills. 
Two independent-sample T-tests were conducted:  The first one compares the 
assessment means in high fraud risk scenarios between the two groups of auditors (group 
1 and group 2).  The second T-test is conducted to compare the assessment means in low 
fraud risk scenarios between the two groups of auditors (group 3 and group 4).  The results 
shown in Table 4.3. confirm the two sub-hypotheses H1a and H1b and hence H1 is 
confirmed with a high significance(p=0.000).  
         Table 4.3. T-tests Results: Fraud Risk Valuation (High and Low Fraud Risk 
Scenarios).  
Assessment type 
Auditors with high 
forensic skills 
Auditors with low 
forensic skills 
 
T-stat 
value 
Sig. 
 
Hypothesis 
High fraud risk 
valuation 
Group 1 auditors 
9.23 (N=26, s=.60) 
Group 2 auditors 
6.53 (N=24, s=1.30) 
9.53 0.000** H1a 
confirmed 
Low fraud risk 
valuation 
Group 3 auditors 
7.51 (N=24,s=0.73) 
Group 4 auditors 
4.30 (N=22, s=0.73) 
14.87 0.000** H1b 
confirmed 
* significance at 0.05; ** significance at 0.01, factor: forensic accounting skills 
 
A further analysis is done using two regressions.  First, the variable high fraud 
risk valuation was regressed on the auditors (group 1 and group 2); the results of the first 
regression as reported in table 4.4 produced R² = .65, F (1, 48) = 90.89, p=.000 showing 
that there is a significant relationship between high fraud risk valuation and whether the 
auditors was categorised as having a high or a low forensic skill level.  
Then, the variable low fraud risk valuation was regressed on the auditors (group 
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3 and group 4); the results of the first regression reported in Table 4.5 produced R² = .83, 
F (1, 44) = 221.28, p=.000 showing that there is a significant relationship between low 
fraud risk valuation and whether the auditors were categorised as having a high or a low 
forensic skill level. 
 
Table 4.4. Regression Results High Fraud Risk Valuation: 
Auditors with High Forensic Skill vs Auditors with Low Forensic Skills. 
 
Variable Coefficient T-statistics Sig. 
Constant 6.53 31.93  
Group 1 2.70 9.53 0.000 
Dependent variable: high fraud risk valuation 
 
Table 4.5 Regression Results: Low Fraud Risk Valuation: 
Auditors with High Forensic Skill vs Auditors with Low Forensic Skills. 
Variable Coefficient T-stat  value Sig. 
Constant 4.30 25.59  
group 3 3.21 14.87 0.000 
Dependent variable: low fraud risk valuation 
Regression results in Table 4.4 reveal that there is on average a difference of 
2.7/10 in high fraud risk valuation between the auditors of group 1 and 2.  Similarly, the 
regression results in Table 4.5 reveal that there is on average a difference of 3.2/10 in low 
fraud risk valuation between the auditors of group 3 and group 4. 
4.5 Analysis of Hypothesis: H2 
 
Figure 4.3. Research Framework -Hypothesis 2 
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Hypothesis 2 measures the second linkage in the research framework as depicted in 
Figure 4.3 testing the researcher’s prediction that government auditors who are primed 
with high forensic accounting skills will develop a mental representation in a different 
way to those auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  Hypothesis 2 breaks into four 
sub-hypotheses: 
H2(a): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a 
fraud mental representation, as measured by a recall task, higher than government 
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
H2(b): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop a 
fraud mental representation, as measured by a memory recognition task, higher than 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
H2(c): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an 
audit mental representation, as measured by a recall task, lower than government 
auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
H2(d): Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills would develop an 
audit mental representation, as measured by a memory recognition task, lower than 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. 
 
Four statistical t-tests were conducted to compare the two groups of auditors on the 
four variables related to mental representation.  The results of the four t-tests reported in 
Table 4.6 reveal that in the case of fraud issues (in both recall and memory recognition), 
auditors with high forensic accounting skills scored on average significantly higher than 
auditors with lower forensic accounting skills (4.20 vs.1.08 p=0.00 for recall; and 3.32 
vs. 2.37 p=0.00 for memory recognition). This confirms H2a and H2c. 
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Table 4.6. t-tests for Comparing the Two Groups of Auditors Means on the Four Variables 
Related To Mental Representation. 
 
Variable Auditors with 
high forensic 
accounting 
skills (N=50) 
Auditors with 
low forensic 
accounting 
skills (N=46) 
     
t-stat 
value 
 
    p-value  
( 
    
    Hypothesis 
Fraud recall  
issues 
4.20 (1.47) 1.08 (0.78) 12.78 0.00** H2a 
confirmed 
Audit recall  
issues 
1.58 (0.88) 2.80 (0.83) -6.94 0.00** H2b 
confirmed 
Fraud memory 
recognition issues 
3.32 (.47) 2.37 (0.67) 8.024 0.00** H2c 
confirmed 
Audit memory 
recognition issues 
2.26 (.49) 3.87 (0.34) -18.61 0.00** H2d 
confirmed 
      ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Between parentheses are standard deviations 
 
However, on audit issues (in both recall and memory recognition), auditors with high 
forensic accounting skills scored on average significantly lower than auditors with high 
forensic accounting skills (1.58 vs. 2.8, p=0.00 for recall and 2.26 vs. 3.87, p=0.00 for 
memory recognition). This confirms hypotheses H2b and H2d. 
4.6 Analysis of Hypothesis: H3 
Hypothesis 3, as highlighted in Figure 4.4, predicts that those with a high mental 
representation in fraud issues would assess higher in both low and high fraud risk 
scenarios.  Further, H3 predicts that those with a high mental representation in audit issues 
would assess lower in both low and high fraud risk scenarios.  So, Hypothesis 3 breaks 
into two sub-hypotheses: 
H3(a): Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud issues will 
assess fraud risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental 
representation in fraud issues. 
H3(b): Government auditors with high mental representation in audit issues will 
assess fraud risk valuation lower than government auditors with high mental 
representation in fraud issues. 
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Figure 4.4 Research Framework -Hypothesis 3 
 
To test H3(a) and H3(b), the researcher had conducted two single multiple 
regressions where the dependent variable is the aggregated score of the auditors in 
assessing both high and low fraud risk case scenarios.  The first regression independent 
variable is the mental representation aggregated score on fraud issues (recall + memory 
recognition).  The second regression independent variable is the mental representation 
aggregated score on audit issues (recall + memory recognition).  To confirm H3(a), a 
significant positive regression coefficient is expected and to confirm H3(b) a significant 
negative coefficient is expected.  Conducting only one single multiple regression is 
avoided because of a high multi-colinearity due to a high negative correlation between 
the two independent variables (=-0.7). 
As shown in Table 4.7, regression results R² = 0.38, F (1, 94) = 57.85, p=0.000 
confirms H3(a).  The second regression results R² = 0.21, F (1, 94) = 24.36, p=0.000 
confirms H3(b). 
 
Table 4.7. Effect of Mental Representation on Fraud Risk Valuation 
Model Independent variable Coef. t-stat 
value 
Sig. Hypothesis 
I Mental Representation Fraud Issues 7.62 7.61 0.000 H3a confirmed 
II Mental Representation Audit Issues -1.56 -4.9 0.000 H3b confirmed 
Dependent variable: fraud risk valuation (low and high fraud risk scenarios) 
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4.7 Analysis of Hypothesis: H4   
In this section, the mental representation mediation effect between forensic 
accounting skills and fraud risk assessment is tested.  If mediation is confirmed, then there 
is no direct effect between auditors’ forensic skill and their fraud risk valuation in both 
case scenarios (low fraud issues and high fraud issues).  Mediation is tested according to 
the following four conditions which Baron and Kenny (1986) identify as necessary for 
mediation to occur: 
1. The independent variable, forensic accounting skills, must be significantly related to 
the dependent variable, fraud risk valuation.  Path (H1) represents this relationship. 
Already tested. 
2. The independent variable, forensic accounting skills, must be significantly related to 
the mental representation (recall and memory recognition) as being a possible 
mediator.  Path (H2) represents this relationship. Already tested. 
3. The mental representation (recall and memory recognition) must be significantly 
related to the dependent variable, fraud risk valuation.  Path (H3) represents this 
relationship. Already tested. 
4. The effect of the independent variable, forensic accounting skills, on the dependent 
variable, fraud risk valuation, must be significantly less after controlling for mental 
representation (recall and memory recognition) as a possible mediator.  
Conditions 1, 2 and 3 have already been tested and confirmed.  Condition 4 is tested 
for both Fraud and Audit issues separately by conducting two multiple regressions.  The 
dependent variable is the fraud risk valuation in both regressions.  In the first regression, 
the two independent variables are forensic skills and the mental representation in Fraud 
issues which produced R² = .64, F (2, 93) = 82.6, p=.000 and reported in Table 4.8 
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Table 4.8 Testing Mediation of Mental Representation Fraud Issues 
Independent Variable Coef. t-stat 
value 
Sig.  
Const 9.982    
Forensic skill .840 7.585 0.000 No mediation 
Mental representation fraud issues .247 1.107 .271  
Dependent variable: fraud risk valuation 
The above results reveal that still there is a significant relationship between 
forensic skills and fraud risk valuation (Coef=.84, t-stat=7.5, p=0.000). This proves that 
the relationship between auditors’ forensic skill and fraud risk valuation is direct and there 
is no apparent support for a mediation. 
In the second multiple regression that was performed to support the previous 
results, the two independent variables, forensic skills and mental representation in audit 
issues, produced R² = .61, F (2, 93) = 75.1, p=.000 as reported in Table 4.9 and reveal 
that there is still a significant relationship between forensic skills and fraud risk valuation 
(Coef=1.136, t-stat=10.6, p=0.000).  
Table 4.9 Testing Mediation of Mental Representation Audit Issues 
Independent Variable Coef. t-stat 
value 
Sig.  
Const 3.669    
Forensic Skill 1.136 10.6 0.000 No mediation 
Mental Representation Audit Issues .826 2.663 .009  
Dependent variable: fraud risk valuation 
 
This demonstrates again that the relationship between forensic skills and fraud 
risk valuation is direct and there is no obvious support for a mediation. 
 
4.8 Summary 
The purpose of this quantitative research study was to examine the effects of 
forensic accounting skills on fraud risk assessment.  
For Hypothesis 1, the results of the analysis showed that government auditors with 
high forensic accounting skills assessed fraud risk assessment higher in both high and low 
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fraud risk scenarios than government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
For Hypothesis 2, the results of the analysis showed that government auditors with 
high forensic accounting skills developed a mental representation that is different from 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  
For Hypothesis 3, the results show that government auditors with a high fraud 
mental representation would have a better fraud risk valuation.  Further, the results show 
that government auditors with high audit mental representation would have a lower fraud 
risk valuation (in both low and high fraud case scenarios) than auditors with low audit 
mental representation.    
For Hypothesis 4, analysis showed that mental representation does not mediate 
the relationship between forensic skill and fraud risk valuation. Therefore, the 
relationship between the two variables is direct and not through mental representation.  
Chapter 5 covers a further discussion of the results presented in this chapter. The 
hypotheses will be reviewed and the potential implications for each of the results of the 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction  
Lately, a series of frauds have been committed in both the public and private 
sectors.  According to Dubai’s police chief, Dhabi Khalfan Tamim, dishonesty and 
deception within Dubai’s state-linked companies is very high, and tough new forfeits will 
be imposed on violators.  A recently issued declaration gives the power to apply prison 
terms of up to 20 years for criminals.  The Government also extended financial rules in 
the wake of its debt crisis.  However, analysts have noted that regulation in Dubai has 
failed to keep up with the rapid growth in business (Sleiman, 2009).  
Because of the number preponderance of scandals involving fraudulent practices, 
detecting fraud has become a high priority within the accounting profession (Salem, 
2012).  Determining and assessing fraud requires specialised skills that may not always 
feature in the training and knowledge of auditors.  Auditors have the capability to detect 
fraud, but they often lack the necessary skills and knowledge to translate this information 
into a plan that can aid in the future identification of risk factors for fraudulent activities 
(Boritz et al., 2014).  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine if there was a significant 
difference in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation of government auditors 
who had low and high forensic accounting skills.  The study also examined the role of 
mental representation in the connection between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk 
valuation of government auditors.  This exploration would enrich the knowledge of 
auditors, through raising awareness of the importance of skills in forensic accounting, 
which in turn could enhance their ability when conducting a fraud risk assessment.  
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5.2 Summary and Interpretation of the Findings 
5.2.1 Research Question 1 
For this research question, government auditors with high forensic accounting 
skills scored an average of (M=9.23) in a high fraud risk scenario; significantly higher 
than those with low forensic accounting skills, who scored on average (M=6.53).  This 
confirms hypothesis H1(a).  Government auditors with high forensic accounting skills 
scored an average of (M= 7.51) in a low fraud risk scenario; significantly higher than 
those with low forensic accounting skills, who scored on average (M=4.30).  This 
confirms hypothesis H1(b).  As a result, Table 4.3 confirms the two sub-hypotheses H1 
(a) and H1 (b) and hence H1 is confirmed with a high significance (p=0.000) which 
confirms the main hypothesis H1, that government auditors with high forensic accounting 
skills will assess fraud risk valuation higher in both high and low fraud risk scenarios 
compared to government auditors with low forensic accounting skills. 
The results of the data analysis indicated that auditors with low forensic 
accounting skills assessed fraud risk lower than those with high forensic accounting skills.  
These results confirmed previous literature that suggests that auditors are usually poor 
evaluators of fraud risk (Cushing et al., 1995; Knapp and Knapp, 2001; Allen et al., 2006), 
especially those with low forensic accounting skills.  Auditors are not conventionally 
trained to handle fraud assessment because of the specialised training and advanced 
knowledge required for these tasks (Asare et al., 2015).  The outcomes of the study 
indicated that government auditors who lack forensic accounting skills are likely to 
perform poorly in conducting fraud assessments.     
The results also confirmed Jaffar et al.’s (2008) statement that in a high fraud risk 
situation, an auditor’s capability to assess fraud risk has a positive effect on their ability 
to detect the likelihood of fraud.  In a low fraud risk scenario, an auditor’s capability to 
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measure fraud risk has a negative effect on their ability to detect the likelihood of fraud. 
The results of this study showed that both auditors with high forensic accounting skills 
and those with low forensic accounting skills assessed lower in the low fraud risk 
scenarios than in the high fraud risk scenarios.  These findings suggest that high technical 
skills are needed from government auditors, similar to the skills of forensic accountants, 
when faced with a scenario where the likelihood detection of fraud is considered low.  In 
situations where the existence of fraud is high and rampant, the level of skills of 
government auditors in conducting fraud assessment may be sufficient.     
Based on the theoretical framework of the fraud diamond theory (Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004), the results of the study confirm the importance of perceived 
opportunity to commit fraud in an organisation.  The perception of apparent opportunity 
suggests that persons will take advantage of the conditions available to them (Kelly and 
Hartley, 2010).  The tendency for many government auditors to have low forensic skills 
is an opportunity that can foster fraud in an organisation.    
5.2.2 Research Question 2 
For this research question, the outcomes from the recall tasks and the score of the 
memory recognition tasks were used.  The government auditors’ responses were grouped 
into three categories: audit-related issues, fraud-related issues and case fact issues.  The 
results supported the hypothesis: government auditors with high forensic accounting 
skills will develop a mental representation that is dissimilar from that of government 
auditors with low forensic accounting skills. 
The results of t-tests in Table 4.6 reveal that on fraud issues (in both recall and 
memory recognition), government auditors with high forensic accounting skills scored on 
average significantly higher than government auditors with lower forensic accounting 
skills (4.20/1.08 for recall and 3.32/2.37 on memory recognition).  These results confirm 
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H2(a) and H2(c).  However, on audit issues (in both recall and memory recognition), 
government auditors with high forensic accounting skills scored on average significantly 
lower than government auditors with high forensic accounting skills (1.58/2.8 for recall 
and 2.26/3.87 on memory recognition).  These results confirm H2(b) and H2(d).  
As a result, Table 4.6 confirms the four sub-hypotheses H2(a); H2(b); H2(c); 
H2(d) and hence H2 is confirmed with a high significance (p=0.000) which, in turn, 
confirms the main hypothesis H2 that government auditors with high forensic accounting 
skills will develop a mental representation that is different from government auditors with 
low forensic accounting skills. 
The results of the study confirmed previous literature that states that auditors and 
forensic investigators have different mental representations regarding fraud.  In the 
study’s case, although government auditors were the only participants, the groups differed 
in skill set.  As discussed in the literature review, auditors and forensic investigators differ 
in their forensic accounting skills.  According to Harris and Brown (2000, p. 6), ‘a 
forensic accountant possesses skills exceeding those of a traditional auditor and provides 
services beyond the scope of a typical financial audit engagement.’ 
A forensic auditor also looks for many other matters related to fraud discovery, 
including identifying income before it is received or recording fictitious revenues, shifting 
revenue to other periods, and not disclosing obligations owed by a corporation (Crumbley 
and Apostolou, 2002).  Forensic accountants are then often called in to investigate and 
resolve concerns that financial misstatements may be indicative of fraud (Golden et al., 
2006).  The results of the study highlight the difference between government auditors and 
forensic accountants in the mental representation of fraud and the processes employed in 
detecting fraud.  The differences in mental representation are a possible reflection of the 
difference in skill level and scope of knowledge between government auditors and 
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forensic accountants. 
  The differences in mental representation of fraud between auditors and forensic 
investigators could explain the differences in the level of skill in assessing fraud. The 
results of the study suggest that these differences in mental representation of fraud 
possibly create an environment where employees have the opportunity to commit fraud.  
The corporate culture of companies influences the effect of the components of the fraud 
diamond theory (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004) in the occurrence of fraud (Schuchter and 
Levi, 2016).  Corporate culture can influence whether fraud is perpetrated or more anti-
fraud behaviours are encouraged (Davis and Pesch, 2013).  
5.2.3 Research Question 3 
For this research question, the results from table 4.7 reveals that there is a 
significant positive regression coefficient between mental representation and fraud issues 
(t-value = 7.61) which confirms H3(a), and a significant negative coefficient between 
mental representation and audit issues (t-value = - 4.9) which confirms H3(b).  As a result, 
table 4.7 confirms the two sub-hypotheses H3(a); and H3(b); and hence H3 is confirmed 
with a high significance (p=0.000) which, in turn, confirms the main hypothesis H3  that 
Government auditors with high mental representation in fraud issues will assess fraud 
risk valuation higher than government auditors with low mental representation in fraud 
issues, whereas, government auditors with high mental representation in audit issues will 
assess fraud risk valuation lower than auditors with high mental representation in fraud 
issues.   
5.2.4 Research Question 4 
  For this research question, the results in table 4.7 reveals that there is a significant 
relationship between forensic skills and fraud risk valuation (Coef=.84, t-stat=7.5, 
p=0.000). This proves that the relationship between auditors’ forensic skill and fraud risk 
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valuation is direct and there is no support for a mediation. 
The results of the study suggested that there is a direct relationship between 
forensic skill and fraud risk valuation and mental representation does not mediate this 
relationship, which doesn’t support previous research studies (Chui, 2010; Boritz et al, 
2014) 
According to Boritz et al (2014), mental representations of fraud can influence an 
accountants’ ability to conduct fraud assessments.  When mental representations are 
applied in forensic accounting, forensic accountants appear to be more skilled than 
government auditors in effective fraud risk assessment.   
Boritz et al. (2014) suggests that the format of mental representation of auditors 
can affect their ability to assess risk.  The quantity of domain-specific knowledge 
influences the content and quality of an individual’s mental representations (Larkin, 1983; 
Glaser, 1984).  The results of the study confirmed the explanation of mental 
representation, as it was found that government auditors with high forensic accounting 
skills tend to form mental representations that are qualitatively different from those of 
government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  The difference in their forensic 
accounting skills led to the difference in their mental representation.  The analysis of the 
findings is that forensic accounting skills create a mental representation that enhances 
effectiveness in conducting fraud assessments and investigations.    
With regard to the theoretical framework, specifically the importance of 
opportunity in committing fraud (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004), the results of the study 
suggest that mental representations play an important role in the ability of experts to 
assess and identify fraud.  The perpetration of fraud is likely to continue in the absence 
of the necessary processes to detect fraud within organisations, underscoring the 
importance of accurate mental representations of fraud (Lenz et al., 2016; Schuchter and 
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Levi, 2016).  
As the current study doesn’t reveal the impact of the assumed mediation factor, 
mental representation, the lack of impact may be due to the current research design. Also, 
there could be other mediating variables that the current research hasn’t captured, such as 
mind set, knowledge and experience. Studying the impact of the three possible mediating 
variables represents future research opportunities. 
5.3 Implications of Findings 
This study makes several significant contributions.  From a contribution to 
knowledge perspective, this study is the first to examine how different skills in 
forensic accounting affect fraud risk valuations.  The researcher identifies the major 
contributions of this study under three categories: theoretical; methodological; and 
practical.   
Amongst the theoretical contributions, this study has discussed and examined the 
skills of forensic accounting within the context of organisations in Dubai.  Moreover, 
it has established the intervening variable of mental representation in the relationship 
between forensic accounting skills and fraud risk valuation.  In addition, this study 
proved the positive influence of forensic accounting skills on fraud risk valuation.  
Methodological contributions include the unique use of respondents who are 
government auditors (from Financial Audit Department in Dubai) instead of student 
substitutes.  Also, the study utilised the technique of G*Power software to determine 
the appropriate sample size, offering an accessibility advantage, higher speed, and 
lower costs in recruiting sample study participants (Coy, 2008).  
On a practical level, this study revealed the value of forensic accounting skills as 
a significant proficiency requirement in the work place.  This study has the potential 
to contribute to the Financial Audit Department, public prosecution, regulatory, 
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organisations and lawful accounting and auditing firms.  
In addition to the above contributions, the results add to the literature on 
performance variations between different skills in forensic accounting, on fraud risk 
task performance and on how to improve auditors’ response to fraud through forensic 
accounting skills.   
 Based on the results of the fraud risk valuation, and from the perspective of 
contribution to practice, auditors and companies will be able to identify ‘when and 
where to concentrate their audit procedures’ (Gerson et al., 2006). Determining the 
scope and depth of the audit procedures will enhance the possibility of detecting fraud 
(Bloomfield, 1997; Wuerges, 2011).  If an inspection firm was to assess low risk in 
high fraud risk scenarios, the firm would face the danger of being subject to major 
penalties, including litigation, costly settlements, and loss of reputation (Palmrose, 
1987).  The results of this study can help auditors in financial audit departments to 
improve their skills in forensic accounting and thereby their fraud detection 
capability. 
The findings that government auditors who have low forensic skills are more 
likely to have low abilities to detect fraud imply an opportunity for fraud to occur in 
government agencies.  Rae and Subramanian (2008) highlighted that opportunity 
refers to the capability and power of a member to recognise weaknesses within an 
organisational system and to take advantage of these, making fraud probable.  
Forensic experts handle fraud assessment because of the specialised training and 
knowledge they have (Asare et al., 2015).  Because auditors are not conventionally 
trained to perform fraud assessment (Asare et al., 2015), more training appears to be 
needed in order to improve their ability to assess and detect fraud in their 
organisations.  
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The study will also benefit both companies and future auditors, as there have been 
signs that the future demand for auditing services will be reliant upon an auditor’s 
ability to detect a fraud.  As discussed previously, old-style auditing has a limited 
capacity to detect deceitful practices, which the forensic accountants will effectively 
fill.  Thus, the results highlight a need for auditors to be trained in forensic accounting 
skills.  Also, the implications of these findings are important to practitioners, 
regulators, accounting researchers and educators, because SAS No. 99 requires 
auditors to document the fraud-risks identified during an audit.  Finally, this research 
study and the results have revealed that more effort should be directed toward 
providing training and enhanced forensic accounting skills to qualify as an auditor, 
since detecting fraud has become a high priority within the accounting profession 
(Elliott, 2002). 
5.4 Limitations 
All studies have limitations that affect the degree of generalisation of the findings 
(Creswell, 2003), and this study is subject to some of confines.   
This research’s results are constrained by using the Lakeview case tool: the fraud 
scenario used to test Dubai government accountants’ fraud risk assessment performance. 
The case study, Lindberg (1999), which has been used in this research, is a suitable tool 
for evaluating government auditors’ fraud risk evaluation performance.  The case was 
reformed and adjusted to the purpose of this research.  The case is very well known in the 
literature. Fraud risk research papers, Carpenter et al., 2002 and Carpenter et al., 2008, 
subsequently based their research on the same case.   
The population and sample size bound the study results.   Including other government, 
auditors will yield additional results and will project the results at a wider scope.  The 
study was also restricted by having participants only who worked for the government.  
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Auditors from the private sector were not included. 
The sample size for the study was determined through an examination using 
G*Power procedure (see Appendix A).  The procedure indicated that a minimum sample 
of 55 data sets is required for the different study variables. Therefore, a sample of 96 
government auditors from the FAD was appropriate to participate in this study. 
5.5 Recommendations 
For researchers, one recommendation is to use a mixed-method research design 
using both a survey and an interview (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004) to raise the 
number of respondents.  It would also be desirable to replicate the present study using 
different case scenarios and/or people.  The current study utilised Dubai government 
auditors as the study population, and future studies may wish to include internal and 
external auditors from Dubai or the other Emirates.   
Further, it is recommended, for future research, to use Dubai-based case scenarios 
from Dubai Courts records and/or UAE courts. 
As the private sector auditors were not part of the current research design, it would 
also be useful to include auditors of the private sector as well.  Rose et al., 2009 postulates 
and argues that professional forensic accountants/auditors should have distinct education, 
experience and knowledge structure to be able to handle their duties and responsibilities. 
Thus, the relationships between forensic accounting skills, mental representation, and 
knowledge structure, would be worthy of future research. It is recommended that further 
studies should use a different populations and sampling methods, such as probability 
sampling techniques.  
To expand the literature on mental representation of fraud, future studies could 
explore how these representations are different in terms of level of forensic assessment 
skills.  Future studies could explore how internal or non-governmental auditors who have 
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low forensic assessment skills view fraud compared to auditors who have high forensic 
assessment skills.  This information could lead to deeper insights into the mental 
representations that might be more effective in assessing fraud in organisations.    
One policy recommendation that can help auditors improve their forensic 
assessment skills is to be exposed to more training.  Engaging in more specialised case-
based training may be helpful in bridging the gap between the current forward-looking 
skills of forensic experts and the limited skills of auditors to assess fraud (Asare et al., 
2015).  Leaders of organisations can sponsor fraud assessment training to enhance the 
skills of their auditors and possibly discourage an organisational culture where fraud is 
widespread.  
Finally, many respondents have shown high interest and enthusiasm in the 
research topic an area. Many have asked to see the results and forward the concepts and 
themes of the research to the higher-level Dubai authorities. 
5.6 Summary 
In conclusion, the study conducted was a quantitative study that aimed to examine 
if there was a substantial difference in the fraud risk valuation and mental representation 
of government auditors who had low and high forensic accounting skills.  The study also 
examined the role of mental representation in the connection between the forensic 
accounting skills and fraud risk valuation of government auditors.  The researcher 
expected a government auditor with high forensic accounting skills to recall fewer 
materiality-related items than an auditor with low forensic accounting skills.  In addition, 
it was expected that a government auditor with low forensic accounting skills would recall 
more audit-related issues than those with high forensic accounting skills.  For the memory 
recognition test, it was expected that government auditors with high forensic accounting 
skills would score higher for the fraud-related statements than those with low forensic 
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accounting skills, while government auditors with low forensic accounting skills would 
score higher for the audit-related statements than those with high forensic accounting 
skills.  In addition, it was expected that there would be no significant difference in 
performance between these two forensic accounting groups regarding the false sentences.  
The results confirmed the researcher’s hypotheses.  Auditors with high forensic 
accounting skills recalled more items and scored higher for fraud-related issues than those 
with low forensic accounting skills.  Auditors with low forensic accounting skills recalled 
more items and scored higher for audit-related issues than those with high forensic 
accounting skills, and there was no significant difference between the groups of 
government auditors regarding the false sentences.  The results also confirmed the sub-
hypotheses for each research question.  Government auditors with high forensic 
accounting skills assessed greater fraud risk in both the high and low fraud risk scenarios 
than government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  Government auditors with 
high forensic accounting skills developed a mental representation that was qualitatively 
different from government auditors with low forensic accounting skills.  Lastly, the 
relationship between auditors’ forensic skills and fraud risk valuation is direct and there 
is no support for a mediation.  With the growing number of fraud cases in Dubai, 
consideration of these results could be valuable in helping audit firms know where to 
focus on improving their ability to detect fraud.  
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Appendix B - Informed Consent Agreement 
 
RESEARCH TITLE: Knowledge of Forensic Accounting and Performance of 
Auditors: An Exploratory Study on Government of Dubai Auditors 
RESEARCHER: Abdulla Yaser Amiri 
I have been given information about "Knowledge of Forensic Accounting and 
Performance of Auditors" and discussed the research project with researcher’s Abdulla 
Yaser Amiri who is conducting this research as part of the award of the degree "Doctor 
of Business Administration" supervised by Dr. Munir Lutfi (Business and Management 
Department); Dr. Tchan Latif (Engineering and Information Sciences Department) at 
the University of Wollongong in Dubai. 
I have been advised of the potential risks and burdens associated with this 
research, in which there are no known risks for me in this study, and have had an 
opportunity to ask the researcher any questions I may have about the research and my 
participation. 
I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary, I am free to 
refuse to participate and I am free to withdraw from the research at any time. My refusal 
to participate or withdrawal of consent will not affect my treatment in any way /my 
relationship with the Financial Audit Department or my relationship with the University 
of Wollongong in Dubai. 
If I have any enquiries about the research, I can contact (Abdulla Yaser Amiri- 
mobile phone: 0097150/8777477; email: abdullaamiri@gmail.com; supervisors: 1. Dr. 
Munir Lutfi, 009714/3672422; email: munirlutfi@uowdubai.ac.ae. 2. Dr. Tchan Latif, 
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009714/3900407; email: Tchanlatif@uowdubai.ac.ae ) or if I have any concerns or 
complaints regarding the way the research is or has been conducted, I can contact the 
Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Office of Research, University of 
Wollongong on 4221 3386 or email: rso-ethics@uow.edu.au. 
 
I understand that the data collected from my participation will be used for 
purpose (e.g. thesis, journal publication, etc.), and I consent for it to be used in that 
manner. 
Signed       Date 
.......................................................................  ......./....../...... 
Name (please print) 
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Appendix E - Questionnaire for the High Risk Scenario 
Forensic Accounting Skills and Fraud Risk Assessment Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is anonymous and aims to measure forensic accounting skills by 
Dubai government auditors; as well as, how they apply these skills during their fraud 
risk assessment.  It forms part of a larger Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) 
project.  The questionnaire is intended for Dubai government auditors.  This will help 
to ensure the findings from this project offer a fair representation of government 
auditors as a whole.  All answers will be anonymous and should take between 30 and 
50 minutes to complete, depending on your answers. 
Completing this questionnaire is voluntary and a decision not to participate will not 
prejudice you in any way.  If you decide to participate, you are free to discontinue 
participation at any time. 
If you have any enquiries about the research, you can contact: 
1. Abdulla Yaser Amiri- mobile phone: 0097150/8777477; email: 
abdullaamiri@gmail.com. 
2. Supervisors: 1. Dr. Munir Lutfi, 009714/3672422; email: 
munirlutfi@uowdubai.ac.ae. 
                         2. Dr. Tchan Latif, 009714/3900407; email: 
Tchanlatif@uowdubai.ac.ae. 
 Or if you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way the research is or has 
been conducted, you can contact the Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics 
Committee, Office of Research, University of Wollongong on 4221 3386 or email 
rso-ethics@uow.edu.au. 
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Investigation Instrument – Forensic Accounting Skills and Fraud Risk Valuation 
 
Part I –- Measuring forensic accounting skills 
This part aims to examine your litigation and investigative skills of forensic accounting. 
Litigation questions 
1. The forensic accountant’s work as an expert usually results in a written 
report that typically includes all of the following except. 
a) A plan for winning the case 
b) A computation of the damages 
c) The procedures followed in gathering information 
d) The procedures followed in computing the damages 
 
2. The primary person responsible for collecting the actual evidence to be 
introduced in court is: 
a) The attorney or paralegal 
b) A private detective 
c) A fraud investigator 
d) None of the above 
 
3. To be awarded damages for lost profits in contract disputes or civil 
actions, the three basic elements that must be proven include all of the following 
except: 
a) Proximate cause 
b) That damages were incurred with reasonable certainty 
c) That fraud was committed by the defendant 
d) That lost profits were foreseeable at the time the wrongful act 
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was committed 
 
4. The crime of intentionally and permanently converting another's 
property to one's own use is: 
a) Burglary 
b) Embezzlement 
c) Robbery 
d) Fraud 
 
5. SAS No.99, Consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit, 
requires that auditors report any evidence found that fraud may exist to which 
of these? 
a) Inventory accounts 
b) Cash accounts 
c) Financial reports 
d) All of the above 
 
6. The fraud investigation process involves systematically gathering and 
reviewing evidence for the purpose of 
a) Providing proof in court that a fraud has been committed 
b) Documenting the presence or absence of fraud 
c) Satisfying the requirements of SAS 99 
d) None of the above 
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7. Evidence is: 
a) Useful in court only if the plaintiff and defendant can agree on 
its admissibility 
b) Allowed in court only if it is truthful 
c) Most useful if it is relevant, reliable, and valid 
d) Allowed if it passes the test of authenticity 
  
8. Which of the following is not a basic rule of handling evidence? 
a) Keep documents in a secure location 
b) Maintain appropriate chain of custody information 
c) Handle original documents whenever possible 
d) All of the above are basic rules of handling evidence 
 
9. Regarding the fraud investigation report, the investigator should: 
a) Assume it will be challenged in court 
b) Prepare a different report for the court 
c) Assume that the investigation report will be protected under 
attorney-client privilege. 
d) None of the above  
 
10. The fraud reporting process can be defined as: 
a) The process of submitting reports to authorities and insurance 
companies 
b) The process of documenting frauds committed 
c) The process of informing affected stakeholders 
d) None of the above  
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Investigative questions 
 
1. In a forensic accounting investigation, the accountant does which of the 
following? 
a) Uses auditing and other investigative skills 
b) Prepares a written report that usually measures damages to an 
injured party 
c) Analyses what actually happened and develops assumptions 
about what would have happened 
d) All of the above 
 
2. The forensic accountant’s core investigative skills are: 
a) Accounting and auditing skills 
b) Advanced computer skills 
c) Sophisticated statistical skills 
d) Interviewing skills  
 
3. The advantages of going to the interviewee’s location is that: 
a) Relevant documents are likely to be located there 
b) Copies of documents can be made before the accountant leaves 
c) The accountant may be directed to a co-worker at the same 
location for additional information 
d) All of the above apply 
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4. The primary objective in a fraud investigation should be to: 
a) Stop the fraud from continuing 
b) Make an example of the fraudster 
c) Punish the fraudster 
d) All of the above are possible primary objectives 
 
5. When should interviews normally be conducted? 
a) Before documentary evidence is obtained 
b) After a preliminary draft of the fraud investigation report is ready 
c) Once a suspect can be identified 
d) None of the above 
 
6. The correct order of questions to ask subjects who are not suspects is 
best represented as: 
a) Introductory, assessment, informational, and concluding 
b) Introductory, informational, assessment, admission seeking, and 
concluding 
c) Introductory, informational, assessment, and admission seeking 
d) Introductory, informational, assessment, and concluding 
 
7. During an interview, the interviewer should: 
a) Never show anger 
b) Never get angry 
c) Never show anger or get angry 
d) Get angry only if the crime is especially offensive  
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8. An inappropriate way to accuse a suspect is to ask: 
a) "When was the first time you took money from the register?" 
b) "You took the money because you needed to help your mother, 
didn’t you?" 
c) "You took the money, didn't you?" 
d) All of the above are appropriate ways to accuse a suspect.  
 
9. When multiple persons are to be interviewed: 
a) Interview the least suspect persons first and then progress to the 
most culpable. 
b) Interview them in a random order to reduce the likelihood of 
bias. 
c) Interview the most suspect persons first and then progress to the 
least suspect. 
d) None of the above.  
 
10. Subjects who are not guilty usually respond to assessment questions: 
a) Slowly, carefully considering the questions and the implications 
of their answers. 
b) Without hesitation 
c) Indirectly, so that the interviewer has more information 
d) Reluctantly due to a desire to show kindness toward others  
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Part II –– Case Scenario "The researcher have requested consent to use the case, and 
the remaining parts of the instrument".  
Background Information on Lakeview Lumber Inc. 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. is located in the city of Lakeview, a metropolitan area of 
approximately 200,000 people.  Lakeview Lumber sells between 30,000 and 35,000 
different kinds of building materials, lawn and garden products, and home improvement 
supplies to retail customers, as well as to contractors and other building professionals.  
Retail customers are required to pay in cash or by a major credit card at the time of their 
purchase.  However, the vast majority of contractors and building professionals have 
established credit accounts and are billed on a monthly basis.  
 
You, as a government auditor, are assigned to assist Karen Rohan, the “in-charge” 
auditor on the FY2013 Lakeview Lumber audit.  
 
Key Personnel 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc.’s top management team consists of the following key 
executives.  Based on your firm’s prior interaction with these key executives, you have 
some basic knowledge of their background. 
 
John Mosher – Controller 
• John has been the Controller for Lakeview Lumber since 1995.  He 
usually arrives at work with his Ferrari sport car.  He and his wife have recently 
taken out a loan to purchase a new home in an elegant neighbourhood. 
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Terry James – Accounting Manager 
• Terry has a B.A. in accounting and has been with Lakeview Lumber for 
four years.  Prior to working for Lakeview Lumber, Terry was the night auditor 
for a small hotel.  Terry has extensive and detailed knowledge of the Lakeview 
Lumber’s accounting systems as well as their weaknesses.  
Managerial Compensation 
• Lakeview Lumber, Inc. compensates its key personnel primarily through 
a fixed salary schedule.  In a recent board meeting, Lakeview’s board of 
directors approved the motion to award all key personnel a cash bonus at the 
end of each year, starting in FY2013.  Key personnel will receive a cash bonus 
based on a predetermined percentage of the company’s reported net income. 
Lakeview Lumber's Accounting Environment 
Lakeview Lumber Inc. appeared to have some minor weaknesses in its accounting 
systems.  However, these weaknesses did not appear to allow material errors into the 
company’s financial reporting process.  Lakeview management reassured the auditors 
that Lakeview will take appropriate actions to upgrade its accounting systems. 
The Lakeview Lumber’s Audit 
Karen, the current “in-charge” auditor is responsible for seeing that she completes the 
field work for the Lakeview Lumber audit as soon as possible.  Audit hours were 
already over the time that had been budgeted for the job, and Karen believed that there 
was still a substantial amount of time needed to finish the audit, because several audit 
matters had not yet been resolved.  Karen approached you with the following audit 
issues regarding Bad Debts Expense and Product Warranties Expense for FY2013.  She 
would like you to review her analyses of these accounts and provide her with your 
recommendations. 
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Bad Debts Expense 
Bad debts expense as a percentage of credit sales was approximately 3 percent for 
FY2013, whereas in the prior two years bad debts expense as a percentage of credit 
sales was 5.0 percent for both FY2012 and FY2011.  Credit sales for FY2013 were 
about AED 2,600,000.  Review and testing of the trail balance of accounts receivable 
indicated that the amount and percentage of accounts receivable in each ccounting 
period were comparable to prior years.  The percentages used to estimate the 
uncollectable accounts were reduced by almost half in practically category compared 
to the previous year. 
 
When Karen questioned Terry James, the Accounting Manager, about the decreased 
percentages, he stated that John Mosher, the Controller, had instructed him to use the 
lower percentages for FY2013.  Karen subsequently discussed the matter with John, 
who informed Karen that he was expecting customers to pay more quickly in FY2014, 
due to a better than expected growth of the housing market in the area in which 
Lakeview Lumber does business. 
 
Product Warranties Expense 
Lakeview Lumber's warranty expense account for FY2013 was approximately AED 
81,000 representing a 28 percent decrease from FY2012.  Terry stated that the charge 
to warranty expense was “just an estimate provided by John.”  When Karen asked John 
about the decrease in warranty provisions, John stated that the decrease was due to the 
better than expected economic growth in the area.  He explained that builders were less 
particular in a stronger economic climate and they were less inclined to return wood 
and supplies that might be slightly flawed.  Karen then discussed product warranties 
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with Adam Lester, the manager of the cabinets department, since that department 
seemed to experience the largest number of returns.  Adam stated that while he did not 
keep records of returns per se, he would fill out the appropriate paperwork and forward 
it to the accounting department.  Adam said he didn't think that the returns during 
FY2013 were much different from those of FY2012.  Karen subsequently asked Terry 
from the accounting department to provide her with a complete list of returns for 
FY2013. 
Karen sampled 30 transactions throughout FY2013.  All of the sampled transactions 
were supported by proper documentation. 
 
Additional Analysis 
In addition to the above information, Karen provided you with some preliminary 
analysis of both the bad debts expense and the product warranties expense accounts 
prepared by another audit staff member on the Lakeview audit. 
The materiality level for the Lakeview Lumber Inc. audit has been set to approximately 
1.0 percent of the company’s reported sales.  The materiality level for FY2013 was 
AED 52,020. 
 
Bad debts expense: 
 Amounts Supporting calculations 
Bad debts expense as 
currently recorded 
AED 78,000 AED 2,600,000 FY2013 credit sales x 
3% 
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Bad debts expense (if 
applied the same percentage 
– 5.0% for both FY2012 
and FY2011) 
AED 130,000 AED 2,600,000 FY2008 credits sales x 
5% 
Potential understatement of 
bad debts 
  
Expense for FY2013 AED 52,000 AED 130,000 - AED 78,000 
Less: Income taxes (@ 
38%) 
AED 19,760 AED 52,000 x 38% 
Potential decrease to 
currently recorded net 
income 
AED 32,240 AED 52,000 - AED 19,760 
 
 
Comment 1: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED 
32,240 due to the bad debts expense account.  
 
Product warranties expense: 
 Amounts Supporting calculations 
Warranty expense as 
currently recorded 
AED 81,000  
Warranty expense (if 
applied the same 
Percentage - 2.3% for 
AED 119,646 (1) FY 2011 warranty expense 
percentage = warranty sales 
=113,000 /4,876,000 = 2.3% 
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FY2012) (2) FY 2013 warranty = AED 
5,202,000 x 2.3% 
Potential 
understatement of 
warranty  
  
Expense for FY2013 AED 38,646 AED 119,646 - AED 81,000 
Less: income taxes (@ 
38%) 
AED 14,685 AED 38,646 x 38% 
Potential decrease to 
currently recorded net 
income 
AED 23,961 AED 38,646 - AED 14,685 
 
Comment 2: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED 
23,961 due to the product warranties expense account. 
Comment 3: The combined effect of both the bad debts expense and the product 
warranties expense accounts may have overstated the Lakeview Lumber Inc.'s net 
income by AED 56,201 (AED 32,240 + AED 23,961).  
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Lakeview Lumber's Financial Statements 
Lakeview Lumber's income statements for the past three fiscal years are presented in 
Exhibit 1.  Exhibit 2 includes the statements of retained earnings for FY2011 through 
FY2013.  The balance sheets for Lakeview Lumber for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013 
are shown in Exhibit 3.  
EXHIBIT 1 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. 
Income Statements 
(Amounts in thousands, except per share data) 
 FY2013 FY2012 FY2011 
 Unaudited Audited Audited 
 (AED) (AED) (AED) 
Sales 5,202 4,876 4,424 
Cost of sales 3,451 3,359 3,101 
Gross profit  1,751 1,517 1,323 
    
Depreciation  184 174 169 
Bad debts expense           78 125 118 
Warranty expense               81 113 117 
Other selling expense      575 465 342 
Total selling expense       918 877 746 
    
General & administrative     
expenses                     235 224 251 
Total expenses 1,153 1,101 961 
    
Income before tax 598 416 362 
Income taxes                    227 158 138 
Net income  371 258 224 
Earnings per share            3.71 2.58 2.24 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. 
Statements of Retained Earnings 
(Amounts in thousands) 
 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2010 AED 1,735 
FY2011 (audited)  
Add: Net income 224 
Less: Dividends (100) 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2011 AED 1,859 
FY2012 (audited)  
Add: Net income  258 
Less: Dividends  (100) 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2012  AED 2,017 
FY2013 (unaudited)  
Add: Net income  371 
Less: Dividends  (100) 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2013 AED 2,288 
 
 
 
End of Company Information 
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Now that you have finished reviewing the information pertaining to Lakeview Lumber, 
Inc., Karen would like to have you provide her with the following assessment: 
 
Based on your evaluation of Lakeview Lumber, please rank the extent of your 
agreement with the following statements on the scale below. 
 
Q1: The Lakeview Bad Debt Expense account was fairly presented.  Place an “X” at 
the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Strongly disagree                                Neither                                              Strongly 
                                                      disagree or agree                                         agree 
 
Q2: How likely would you do the following in regard to the Lakeview Bad Debt 
Expense account?  Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Not likely at all to take further            Somewhat likely                                Very likely 
action to investigate  
this account 
 
Q3: The Lakeview Product Warranties Expense account was fairly presented.   Place 
an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Strongly disagree                           Neither disagree or agree                    Strongly agree 
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Q4: How likely are you to do the following in regard to the Lakeview Product 
Warranties Expense account?  Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the 
scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Not likely at all to take further             Somewhat likely                               Very likely  
action to investigate  
this account 
 
Q5: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., how 
likely do you think the existence of fraud in Lakeview’s Bad Debt Expense account? 
Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Very unlikely                                          Moderate                                         Very likely        
 
Q6: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., how 
likely do you think fraud exists in Lakeview's Product Warranties Expense account? 
Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Very unlikely                                          Moderate                                         Very likely     
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Q7: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., what 
is your assessment of the overall fraud risk for this client?  Place an “X” at the 
appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Very low                                            moderate                                                  Very high     
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Part III – Recall Task 
In the space provided below please list all of the important information that you can 
remember about Lakeview Lumber Inc.  Write down the information in the order that 
you remember it.  Start a new line for each piece of information.  
1.___________________________________________________________________ 
2.___________________________________________________________________ 
3.___________________________________________________________________ 
4.___________________________________________________________________ 
5.___________________________________________________________________ 
6.___________________________________________________________________ 
7.___________________________________________________________________ 
8.___________________________________________________________________ 
9.___________________________________________________________________ 
10.__________________________________________________________________ 
11.__________________________________________________________________ 
12.__________________________________________________________________ 
13.__________________________________________________________________ 
14.__________________________________________________________________ 
15.__________________________________________________________________ 
16.__________________________________________________________________ 
17.__________________________________________________________________ 
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Recognition Task 
Please answer the following questions about Lakeview Lumber, Inc. by circling YES 
if the item is in the case you have just read and by circling NO if the item is not in the 
case you have just read. 
 
Is the item in the case you just read? 
1. John Mosher, the Controller of Lakeview, was a former auditor of Lakeview.  
Yes  No 
 
2. Karen Rohan, the “in-charge” auditor for the current year Lakeview audit, has 
already exceeded her audit time budget.                    
Yes  No 
 
3. Lakeview gives its management stock options as an incentive to meet earnings.      
Yes  No 
 
4. The economic conditions are making account receivable collections less 
difficult.  
Yes  No 
 
5. The majority of customers pay in cash.      
Yes  No  
 
6. Lakeview has some minor issues with its accounting system.   
Yes  No 
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7. Lakeview’s prior years’ financial statements were fairly presented.  
  
Yes  No 
 
8. Lakeview’s accounting controls may be susceptible to compromise and 
override.    
Yes  No 
 
9. All audit samples were supported by proper documentation.     
Yes  No 
 
10. Adam Lester, the Manager of the Cabinets Department, did not keep detailed 
records receiving reports, but merely forwarded them to Terry James, the Accounting 
Manager. 
Yes  No  
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Part IV –Post-Experimental  
Q1. How interesting was this project? 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -| 
 
0         1         2          3         4          5         6          7         8          9        10 
Not interesting at all              Moderately interesting              Very interesting 
 
Q2. How much effort did you put into completing this project? 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -| 
0         1         2          3         4          5         6          7         8          9        10 
Hardly any effort         Moderate amount of effort    A significant effort 
 
Q3. How knowledgeable do you think you are in relation to the material presented in 
this project? 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -| 
0         1         2          3         4          5         6          7         8          9        10 
Very unknowledgeable         Moderately knowledgeable        Very knowledgeable 
 
Q4. What is your gender? 
1. Male. 
2. Female. 
 
Q5. How old are you? ___________________ 
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Q6. Do you have any qualification in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation or have 
you attended training in this subject?  Please select any that apply to you: 
1. No previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training or degree.   
2. Previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training. 
3. Professional degree in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation. 
4. Other certificates, for example: CPA, CMA, CIA, etc. 
Q7. Please provide any comments that you may have about this study in the space 
below._______________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix F - Questionnaire for the Low Risk Scenario  
Note: In this Appendix F, the researcher used the Lakeview Lumber Inc. case study to 
measure the level of performance of the government auditors in fraud risk valuation 
in Low Fraud Risk Scenario. 
The case has been modified to reflect the Low Fraud Risk Scenario. However, the 
reminaning instruments have been replicated as of the High Risk Scenario.  
 
Forensic Accounting Skills and Fraud Risk Assessment Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is anonymous and aims to measure forensic accounting skills 
amongst Dubai government auditors, as well as how they apply this skills during their 
fraud risk assessment.  It forms part of a larger Doctor of Business Administration 
(DBA) project.  The questionnaire is intended for Dubai government auditors.  This 
will help to ensure the findings from this project offer a fair representation of the 
government auditors as a whole.  All answers will be anonymous and should take 
between 30 and 50 minutes to complete, depending on your answers. 
Completing this questionnaire is voluntary and a decision not to participate will not 
prejudice you in any way.  If you decide to participate, you are free to discontinue 
participation at any time. 
If you have any enquiries about the research, you can contact: 
1. Abdulla Yaser Amiri- mobile phone: 0097150/8777477; email: 
abdullaamiri@gmail.com. 
2. Supervisors: 1. Dr. Munir Lutfi, 009714/3672422;  
email: munirlutfi@uowdubai.ac.ae. 
                         2. Dr. Tchan Latif, 009714/3900407;  
email: Tchanlatif@uowdubai.ac.ae. 
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If you have any concerns or complaints regarding the way the research is or has been 
conducted, you can contact the Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, 
Office of Research, University of Wollongong on 4221 3386 or email rso-
ethics@uow.edu.au. 
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Part I – Measuring Forensic Accounting Skills 
This part aims to examine your litigation and investigative forensic accounting skills. 
 
Litigation questions 
 
1. The forensic accountant’s work as an expert usually results in a written 
report that typically includes all of the following except. 
a) A plan for winning the case 
b) A computation of the damages 
c) The procedures followed in gathering information 
d) The procedures followed in computing the damages 
 
2. The primary person responsible for collecting the actual evidence to be 
introduced in court is: 
a) The attorney or paralegal 
b) A private detective 
c) A fraud investigator 
d) None of the above 
 
3. To be awarded damages for lost profits in contract disputes or civil 
actions, the three basic elements that must be proven include all of the following 
except: 
a) Proximate cause 
b) That damages were incurred with reasonable certainty 
c) That fraud was committed by the defendant 
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d) That lost profits were foreseeable at the time the wrongful act was 
committed 
 
4. The crime of intentionally and permanently converting another's 
property to one's own use is: 
a) Burglary 
b) Embezzlement 
c) Robbery 
d) Fraud 
 
5. SAS No.99, Consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit, 
requires that auditors report any evidence found that fraud may exist to which 
of these? 
a) Inventory accounts 
b) Cash accounts 
c) Financial reports 
d) All of the above 
 
6. The fraud investigation process involves systematically gathering and 
reviewing evidence for the purpose of 
a) Providing proof in court that a fraud has been committed 
b) Documenting the presence or absence of fraud 
c) Satisfying the requirements of SAS 99 
d) None of the above 
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7. Evidence is: 
a) Useful in court only if the plaintiff and defendant can agree on its 
admissibility 
b) Allowed in court only if it is truthful 
c) Most useful if it is relevant, reliable, and valid 
d) Allowed if it passes the test of authenticity 
  
8. Which of the following is not a basic rule of handling evidence? 
a) Keep documents in a secure location 
b) Maintain appropriate chain of custody information 
c) Handle original documents whenever possible 
d) All of the above are basic rules of handling evidence 
 
9. Regarding the fraud investigation report, the investigator should: 
a) Assume it will be challenged in court 
b) Prepare a different report for the court 
c) Assume that the investigation report will be protected under attorney-
client privilege. 
d) None of the above  
 
10. The fraud reporting process can be defined as: 
a) The process of submitting reports to authorities and insurance 
companies 
b) The process of documenting frauds committed 
c) The process of informing affected stakeholders 
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d) None of the above  
 
Investigative questions 
11. In a forensic accounting investigation, the accountant does which of the 
following? 
a) Uses auditing and other investigative skills 
b) Prepares a written report that usually measures damages to an injured 
party 
c) Analyses what actually happened and develops assumptions about what 
would have happened 
d) All of the above 
 
12. The forensic accountant’s core investigative skills are: 
a) Accounting and auditing skills 
b) Advanced computer skills 
c) Sophisticated statistical skills 
d) Interviewing skills  
 
13. The advantages of going to the interviewee’s location is that: 
a) Relevant documents are likely to be located there 
b) Copies of documents can be made before the accountant leaves 
c) The accountant may be directed to a co-worker at the same location for 
additional information 
d) All of the above apply 
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14. The primary objective in a fraud investigation should be to: 
a) Stop the fraud from continuing 
b) Make an example of the fraudster 
c) Punish the fraudster 
d) All of the above are possible primary objectives 
 
15. When should interviews normally be conducted? 
a) Before documentary evidence is obtained 
b) After a preliminary draft of the fraud investigation report is ready 
c) Once a suspect can be identified 
d) None of the above 
 
16. The correct order of questions to ask subjects who are not suspects is 
best represented as: 
a) Introductory, assessment, informational, and concluding 
b) Introductory, informational, assessment, admission seeking, and 
concluding 
c) Introductory, informational, assessment, and admission seeking 
d) Introductory, informational, assessment, and concluding 
 
17. During an interview, the interviewer should: 
a) Never show anger 
b) Never get angry 
c) Never show anger or get angry 
d) Get angry only if the crime is especially offensive  
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18. An inappropriate way to accuse a suspect is to ask: 
a) "When was the first time you took money from the register?" 
b) "You took the money because you needed to help your mother, didn’t 
you?" 
c) "You took the money, didn't you?" 
d) All of the above are appropriate ways to accuse a suspect.  
 
19. When multiple persons are to be interviewed: 
a) Interview the least suspect persons first and then progress to the 
most culpable. 
b) Interview them in a random order to reduce the likelihood of 
bias. 
c) Interview the most suspect persons first and then progress to the 
least suspect. 
d) None of the above.  
 
20. Subjects who are not guilty usually respond to assessment questions: 
a) Slowly, carefully considering the questions and the implications of their 
answers. 
b) Without hesitation 
c) Indirectly, so that the interviewer has more information 
d) Reluctantly due to a desire to show kindness toward others  
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Part II –– Case Scenario "The researcher have requested consent to use the case, and 
the remaining parts of the instrument".  
Background Information on Lakeview Lumber, Inc. 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. is located in the city of Lakeview, a metropolitan area of 
approximately 200,000 people.  Lakeview Lumber sells between 30,000 and 35,000 
different kinds of building materials, lawn and garden products, and home improvement 
supplies to retail customers, as well as to contractors and other building professionals.  
Retail customers are required to pay in cash or by a major credit card at the time of their 
purchase.  However, the vast majority of contractors and building professionals have 
established credit accounts and are billed on a monthly basis.  Lakeview Lumber's main 
competitors in the area are The Home Depot, Inc. and Eagle Hardware & Garden. 
You as a government auditor are assigned to assist Karen Rohan, the “in-charge” 
auditor on the FY2013 Lakeview Lumber audit.  
 
Key Personnel 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc.’s top management team consists of the following key 
executives. Based on your firm’s prior interaction with these key executives, you have 
some basic knowledge of their background. 
 
John Mosher – Controller 
• John has been the Controller for Lakeview Lumber since 1995. He 
usually arrives at work with an old car.  He and his wife have recently been 
saving money to remodel their old room. 
Terry James – Accounting Manager 
• Terry has a B.A. in accounting and has been with Lakeview Lumber for 
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four years.  Prior to working for Lakeview Lumber, Terry was the night auditor 
for a small hotel.  Terry has extensive and detailed knowledge of the Lakeview 
Lumber’s accounting systems as well as operational management.  
Managerial Compensation 
• Lakeview Lumber, Inc. compensates its key personnel primarily through 
a fixed salary schedule.  In a recent board meeting, Lakeview’s board of 
directors approved the motion to award all key personnel a cash bonus at the 
end of each year, starting in FY2013.  Key personnel will receive a cash bonus 
based on the following: (1) salary rank (2) years of work.  The cash bonus 
should not exceed one percent of the individual’s salary. 
 
Lakeview Lumber's Accounting Environment 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. appeared to have some minor weaknesses in its accounting 
systems.  However, they have a strong control over the company’s financial reporting 
process.  Their management reassured the auditors that they will maintain it. 
Lakeview Lumber’s Audit 
Karen, the current “in-charge” auditor is responsible for seeing that she completes the 
field work for the Lakeview Lumber as soon as possible.  Audit hours were already 
over the time that had been budgeted for the job, and Karen believed that there was still 
a substantial amount of time needed to finish the audit, because several audit matters 
had not yet been resolved.  Karen approached you with the following audit issues 
regarding bad debts expense and product warranties expense for FY2013.  She would 
like you to review her analyses of these accounts and provide her with your 
recommendations. 
Bad Debts Expense 
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Bad debts expense as a percentage of credit sales was approximately 4.7 percent for 
FY2013, whereas in the prior two years bad debts expense as a percentage of credit 
sales was 5.0 percent for both FY2012 and FY2011.  Credit sales for FY2013 were 
about AED 2,600,000.  Review and testing of the trail balance of Accounts Receivable 
indicated that the amount and percentage of accounts receivable in each accounting 
period were comparable to prior years.  The percentages used to estimate the 
uncollectable accounts were reduced by almost half in practically category compared 
to the previous year. 
When Karen questioned Terry James, the Accounting Manager, about the decreased 
percentages, he stated that John Mosher, the Controller, had instructed him to use the 
lower percentages for FY2013.  Karen subsequently discussed the matter with John, 
who informed Karen that he was expecting customers to pay more quickly in FY2014, 
due to a better than expected growth of the housing market in the area in which 
Lakeview Lumber does business. 
Product Warranties Expense 
Lakeview Lumber's warranty expense account for FY2013 was approximately AED 
118,000 representing a 4.4 percent increase from FY2012.  Terry stated that the charge 
to warranty expense was “just an estimate provided by John.”  When Karen asked John 
about the increase in warranty provisions, John stated that the increase was due to the 
better than expected economic growth in the area.  Adam stated while he did not keep 
records of returns per se, he would fill out the appropriate paperwork and forward them 
to the Accounting Department.  Adam said he didn't think that the returns during 
FY2013 were much different from those of FY2012.  Karen subsequently asked Terry 
from the Accounting Department to provide her with a complete list of returns for 
FY2013. 
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Karen sampled 30 transactions throughout FY2013.  All of the sampled transactions 
were supported by proper documentation. 
 
Additional Analysis 
In addition to the above information, Karen provided you with some preliminary 
analysis of both the bad debts expense and the product warranties expense accounts 
prepared by another audit staff member on the Lakeview audit. 
The materiality level for the Lakeview Lumber, Inc. audit has been set to approximately 
1.0 percent of the company’s reported sales.  The materiality level for FY2013 was 
AED 52,020. 
Bad Debts Expense: 
 Amounts Supporting calculations 
Bad debts expense as 
currently recorded 
AED 122,200 AED 2,600,000 FY2013 credit sales x 
4.7% 
Bad debts expense (if 
applied the same percentage 
– 5.0% for both FY2012 
and FY2011) 
AED 130,000 AED 2,600,000 FY2008 credits sales x 
5.0% 
Potential understatement of 
bad debts 
  
Expense for FY2013 AED 7,800 AED 130,000 - AED 122,200 
Less: income taxes (@ 
38%) 
AED 2,964 AED 2,964 x 38% 
Potential decrease to 
currently recorded net 
AED 4,836 AED 7,800 - AED 2,964 
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income 
 
Comment 1: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED 4,836 
due to the bad debts expense account.  
 
Product Warranties Expense: 
 Amounts Supporting calculations 
Warranty expense as 
currently recorded 
AED 118,000  
Warranty expense (if 
applied the same percentage 
- 2.3% for FY2012) 
AED 119,646 (1) FY 2011 warranty expense 
percentage  = warranty sales 
=113,000 /4,876,000 = 2.3%   
(2) FY 2013 warranty = AED 
5,202,000 x 2.3% 
Potential understatement of 
warranty  
  
expense for FY2013 AED 1,646 AED 119,646 - AED 118,000 
Less: income taxes (@ 
38%) 
AED 625 AED 1,646 x 38% 
Potential decrease to 
currently recorded net 
income 
AED 1,021 AED 1,646 - AED 625 
 
Comment 2: The current reported net income may have been overstated by AED 1,021 
due to the product warranties expense account.  
Comment 3: The combined effect of both the bad debts expense and the product 
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warranties expense accounts may have overstated the Lakeview Lumber Inc.'s net 
income by AED 5,857 (AED 4,836 + AED 1,021).  
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Lakeview Lumber's Financial Statements 
Lakeview Lumber's income statements for the past three fiscal years are presented in 
Exhibit 1.  Exhibit 2 includes the statements of retained earnings for FY2011 through 
FY2013.  The balance sheets for Lakeview Lumber for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013 
are shown in Exhibit 3.  
EXHIBIT 1 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. Income Statements 
(Amounts in thousands, except per share data) 
 FY2013 FY2012 FY2011 
 Unaudited Audited Audited 
 (AED) (AED) (AED) 
Sales                        5,202 4,876 4,424 
Cost of sales 3,451 3,359 3,101 
Gross profit             1,751 1,517 1,323 
    
Depreciation  184 174 169 
Bad debts expense           122 125 118 
Warranty expense               118 113 117 
Other selling expense      575 465 342 
Total selling expense       999 877 746 
    
General & administrative     
expenses                     235 224 251 
Total expenses 1,234 1,101 961 
    
Income before tax 517 416 362 
Income taxes                    196 158 138 
Net income  321 258 224 
Earnings per share            3.21 2.58 2.24 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Lakeview Lumber, Inc. Statements of Retained Earnings 
(Amounts in thousands) 
 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2010 AED 1,735 
FY2011 (Audited)  
Add: net income 224 
Less: dividends (100) 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2011 AED 1,859 
FY2012 (Audited)  
Add: net income  258 
Less: dividends  (100) 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2012  AED2,017 
FY2013 (Unaudited)  
Add: net income  321 
Less: dividends (100) 
Retained earnings @ end of FY2013 AED ,238 
 
End of Company Information 
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Now that you have finished reviewing the information pertaining to Lakeview Lumber, 
Inc., Karen would like to have you provide her with the following assessment: 
 
Based on your evaluation of Lakeview, please rank the extent of your agreement with 
the following statement on the scale below. 
 
Q1: The Lakeview Bad Debt Expense account was fairly presented.  Place an “X” at 
the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Strongly disagree                                    Neither                                              Strongly 
                                                           disagree or agree                                      agree 
 
Q2: How likely would you do the following in regard to the Lakeview Bad Debt 
Expense account? Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Not likely at all to take further               Somewhat likely                                 Very likely 
action to investigate  
this account 
 
Q3: The Lakeview Product Warranties Expense account was fairly presented.   Place 
an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Strongly disagree                      Neither disagree or agree                      Strongly agree 
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Q4: How likely are you to do the following in regard to the Lakeview Product 
Warranties Expense account?  Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the 
scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Not likely at all to take further                 Somewhat likely                           Very likely  
action to investigate  
this account 
 
Q5: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber, Inc., 
how likely do you think fraud exists in Lakeview’s Bad Debt Expense account?  Place 
an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Very unlikely                                          Moderate                                        Very likely               
 
Q6: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., how 
likely do you think fraud exists in Lakeview's Product Warranties Expense account? 
Place an “X” at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Very unlikely                                          Moderate                                        Very likely               
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Q7: Based on all the information you have reviewed about Lakeview Lumber Inc., what 
is your assessment of the overall fraud risk for this client?  Place an “X” at the 
appropriate place on the scale below. 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - -|- - - - - - -|  
0  1    2      3           4          5            6           7            8             9       10 
Very low                                          Moderate                                                Very high               
  
 
162 
 
Part III – Recall Task 
In the space provided below please list all of the important information that you can 
remember about Lakeview Lumber Inc.  Write down the information in the order 
that you remember it.  Start a new line for each piece of information.  
1.___________________________________________________________________ 
2.___________________________________________________________________ 
3.___________________________________________________________________ 
4.___________________________________________________________________ 
5.___________________________________________________________________ 
6.___________________________________________________________________ 
7.___________________________________________________________________ 
8.___________________________________________________________________ 
9.___________________________________________________________________ 
10.__________________________________________________________________ 
11.__________________________________________________________________ 
12.__________________________________________________________________ 
13.__________________________________________________________________ 
14.__________________________________________________________________ 
15.__________________________________________________________________ 
16.__________________________________________________________________ 
17.__________________________________________________________________ 
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Recognition Task 
Please answer the following questions about Lakeview Lumber, Inc. by circling YES 
if the item is in the case you have just read and by circling NO if the item is not in the 
case you have just read. 
Is the Item in the case you just read? 
1. John Mosher, the Controller of Lakeview, was a former auditor of Lakeview.  
Yes  No 
 
2. Karen Rohan, the “in-charge” auditor for the current year Lakeview audit, has 
already exceeded her audit time budget.        
Yes  No 
 
3. Lakeview gives its management stock options as an incentive to meet earnings. 
Yes  No 
 
4. The economic conditions are making account receivable collections less 
difficult.  
Yes  No 
 
5. The majority of customers pay in cash.        
Yes  No  
 
6. Lakeview has some minor issues with its accounting system.    
Yes  No 
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7. Lakeview’s prior years financial statements were fairly presented.    
Yes  No 
 
8. Lakeview’s accounting controls may be susceptible to compromise and 
override.    
Yes  No 
 
9. All audit samples were supported by proper documentation.   
   
Yes  No 
 
10. Adam Lester, the Manager of the Cabinets Department, did not keep detailed 
records receiving reports, but merely forwarded them to Terry James, the Accounting 
Manager.          
  
Yes  No  
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Part IV –Post-Experimental  
Q1. How interesting was this project? 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -| 
 
0         1         2          3         4          5         6          7         8          9        10 
Not interesting at all                        Moderately interesting                    Very interesting 
 
Q2. How much effort did you put into completing this project? 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -| 
0         1         2          3         4          5         6          7         8          9        10 
Hardly any effort         Moderate amount of effort    A significant effort 
 
Q3. How knowledgeable do you think you are with the material presented in this 
project? 
|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -|- - - - -| 
0         1         2          3         4          5         6          7         8          9        10 
Very unknowledgeable           Moderately knowledgeable             Very knowledgeable 
 
Q4. What is your gender? 
1. Male. 
2. Female. 
 
Q5. How old are you? ___________________ 
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Q6. Do you have any qualification in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation or any 
training in this subject?  Please select any that apply to you: 
1. No previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training or degree.   
2. Previous forensic accounting/ fraud investigation training. 
3. Professional degree in forensic accounting/ fraud investigation. 
4. Other certificates, for example: CPA, CMA, CIA, etc. 
 
Q7. Please provide any comments that you may have about this study in the space 
below._______________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
